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Executive Summary
In this thesis we investigate whether financially constrained firms are fundamentally riskier
than unconstrained firms, whether this risk is priced in the form of a financial constraint
factor, and whether the financial constraint factor represents an independent source of
return movements. The investigation will be in the context of the Norwegian economy
and securities markets.
Using various measures of financial constraints, we form portfolios of constrained and
unconstrained firms in a similar fashion to Fama and French (1992). Following Campello
and Chen (2010) we estimate differences in the real business risk of constrained and
unconstrained firms by regressing their median real operating earnings- and investment
growth on macroeconomic and credit market variables. We test whether the risk is priced
by subtracting the monthly stock market returns of constrained firms from unconstrained
firms, creating a financial constraint factor. Finally, following Lamont et al. (2001), we
investigate whether the financial constraint factor represents an independent source of
movement in returns by regressing it on benchmark asset pricing models, including Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965)’s CAPM, the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model and
the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model.
We find evidence that financially constrained firms are fundamentally riskier than
unconstrained firms, and that this risk is priced in the form of a financial constraint
factor. The results point to financial constraints being time-varying and binding more in
downturns than expansions. We find that a negative oil price shock is associated with
increasing financial constraints in the Norwegian economy. Furthermore, we find that
financially constrained firms in Norway behave in a similar fashion to constrained firms in
the US, suggesting that financial constraints are not significantly different across various
economic settings. Finally, the combined real-financial results point to the existence of a
macroeconomy-equity valuation channel along the lines of Gertler and Bernanke (1989).
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11 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to answer two key questions at the intersection of macroeconomics
and finance. First, are financially constrained firms fundamentally riskier than
unconstrained firms? Second, is this risk priced in securities markets in the form of
an independently identifiable financial constraint factor? We examine these questions in
the context of the Norwegian economy and securities markets.
Business cycles appear to be large, persistent, and asymmetric relative to the shocks
hitting the economy (Acemoglu and Scott (1997)). This observation suggests the existence
of an asymmetric amplification and propagation mechanism, which transforms the shocks
into the observed movements in aggregate output. We investigate whether this mechanism
is linked to financial constraints. Gertler and Bernanke (1989) show that the existence
of asymmetric information gives rise to agency costs associated with external capital,
which depend on a firms financial position. Firms which are dependent on external capital
and are affected by financing imperfections in such a way that they cannot fund all
desired investments, are financially constrained. Since the financial position of firms are
typically procyclical, so are agency costs, and thus financial constraints. If this is the
case, the real operating earnings- and investment growth of constrained firms should
fluctuate significantly more than those of unconstrained firms in response to changing
macroeconomic and credit market conditions. This amounts to asking whether financially
constrained firms are fundamentally riskier than unconstrained firms.
If financially constrained firms show greater covariation with systematic factors because
these firms are disproportionately affected by financing imperfections, then financial
constraints represent an independent source of real risk. Asset pricing models which do
not take this into account will overprice constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms.
If the risk is priced, we should be able to earn an independently identifiable return stream
by purchasing the stocks of constrained firms and selling the stocks of unconstrained firms.
This amounts to asking whether we can identify a financial constraint factor in Norwegian
securities markets.
2To answer our first question, we form annually updated portfolios of constrained and
unconstrained firms using various measures of financial constraints. We regress the median
real operating earnings- and investment growth of these portfolios on proxies of the
macroeconomic and credit market conditions. Using a SUR-system, we test whether the
responses of constrained firms are significantly larger than those of the unconstrained
firms. We find evidence that financially constrained firms are fundamentally riskier than
unconstrained firms, in the sense that the real operating earnings- and investment growth
of constrained firms falls significantly more in response to adverse macroeconomic and
credit market conditions than those of unconstrained firms. The evidence also points to
financial constraints being time-varying and binding more in downturns, which means
constrained firms behave in a procyclical fashion.
We answer the second question in two parts. First, we construct a financial constraint
factor1 by subtracting the returns of a portfolio of constrained firms from the returns of a
portfolio of unconstrained firms. Note that unlike much of the traditional asset pricing
literature, we create factor mimicking portfolios not to match anomalies in the data, but
to measure an economically meaningful concept. We find that constrained firms earn a
significant risk premium over unconstrained firms, indicating the existence of a financial
constraint factor. Furthermore, we show that the financial constraint factor varies with
macroeconomic conditions in such a way that the stock returns of financially constrained
firms underperform those of unconstrained firms in times when financial constraints are
more likely to bind, i.e. downturns and tight credit conditions, and outperform when
constraints are likely to be relaxed.
A key finding of this thesis is the relationship between real business fundamentals, the
financial constraint factor and macroeconomic variables, which point to a macroeconomy-
equity valuation channel2 that works along the lines of Gertler and Bernanke (1989),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke et al. (1999). For example, a negative
macroeconomic shock will reduce the equity valuation of all firms as future expected
cash flows decline. However, for financially constrained firms the reduced net worth
increases agency costs, increasing the external finance premium which leads to a decline
in investment- and earnings growth. Forward looking asset prices such as stocks will then
1A factor is an explanatory variable which helps explain cross-sectional movements in stock returns.
2This was first pointed out for the US by Campello and Chen (2010).
3decline more for financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms, increasing agency
costs again, resulting in a financial accelerator effect.
Second, we test whether financial constraints represent an independent source of return
movements by regressing the financial constraint factor on three benchmark asset pricing
models. We find that the returns of the financial constraint factor as estimated by two of
the financial constraint measures, cannot be explained by known empirical factors. In
sum, the financial results point to the existence of a financial constraint factor which
represents an independent source of return movements.
Our results indicate that financial constraints amplify and propagate real economic shocks.
Discussing the policy implications of this is beyond the scope of the thesis. We note
however, that Gertler and Karadi (2011) show that in periods of tight credit conditions,
i.e. when financial constraints likely bind the most, the benefits of central bank credit
intermediation to offset disruptions in private financial intermediation can be substantial.
They reason that the key advantage of the central bank is that it can elastically obtain
funds by issuing riskless government debt and then use these funds to lend to financially
constrained firms, reducing the subsequent drop in investments and aggregate demand,
thus limiting the amplification of shocks to the economy.
With our thesis we make the following contributions to the literature. First, by investigating
financial constraints in a small open economy we test whether results on financial
constraints found in the US hold generally across different economic environments and time-
frames. We conclude that this seems to be the case. Second, we investigate the interplay
between the oil price and financial constraints in an oil-exporting country. Specifically, we
use SIC codes to create an oil sector with both oil production and exploration companies,
and oil service companies. We find a negative relationship between financial constraints
and the oil price, such that when the oil price is low, financial constraints seem to bind
more and when the oil price is high, financial constraints bind less. We show that one part
of this result stems from the market structure of the oil sector which leads to heterogeneous
responses in the financial positions of firms following oil price shocks. Our results indicate
that the other part of this negative relationship is a consequence of constrained firms
being more sensitive to economic fluctuations than unconstrained firms. Additionally,
as far as we know, financial constraints in Norway were last investigated by Johansen
4(1994).3 We update his findings using a new and more complete method over a longer
sample period.
This thesis is structured as follows. In section 2, we review work on financial constraints,
asset pricing and macroeconomics. In section 3 we provide an explanation of how we
construct our dataset, variables and portfolios. In section 4, we examine the real business
risk of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. In section 5, we construct the
financial constraint factor, examine its relation to business and credit cycles and test
whether financial constraints represent an independent source of return movements. In
section 6 we summarize and present conclusions.
3Johansen uses data from 1977 – 1990, while our sample period is 1996 – 2018. Furthermore, he
applies Euler equation estimates to reach his conclusions, a method different from ours and which is
sensitive to the choice of specification and tend to have poor small-sample properties (Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995)).
52 Literature and Theory Review
In this chapter we highlight the relevant literature for our thesis. We will review earlier
work to feature the relevance of the topic and construct a basis for the methodology and
hypotheses of our research.
2.1 Financial Constraints Introduction
Financial constraints are not directly observable, hence it is difficult to provide a precise
definition of what financial constraints are and which firms are financially constrained.
Lamont et al. (2001) simply define financial constraints as frictions that prevent firms from
funding all desired investments. These frictions typically include asymmetric information,
agency costs and incomplete contractibility. Furthermore, they emphasize that financial
constraints are not the same as financial distress- and bankruptcy costs, even though the
two are indisputably correlated. Tirole (2010) explains that financial constraints arise due
to frictions in the supply of capital, with the key friction being information asymmetries
between investors and the firm. Supply frictions decrease the elasticity of the supply
of the external capital curve, driving a wedge between the internal and external cost of
capital. Along these lines, Almeida and Campello (2001) observe that “constrained firms
are at the point where the supply of capital becomes inelastic.”
We follow Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) and briefly formalize these general
observations. Denote a firms capital supply curve by p(k), which specifies the price
at which a firm with k units of capital can raise an incremental unit of capital externally.
The extent of financial constraints is then characterized in terms of the elasticity of p(k).
The steeper, i.e. more inelastic, the supply curve, the more financially constrained the
firm. From the general definitions above, a firm is financially constrained if it faces a
highly inelastic supply curve, such that
∂p(k)
∂k
k
p(k)
>> 0 (2.1)
6 2.1 Financial Constraints Introduction
Figure 2.1 illustrates this definition graphically.
(a) Constrained Firms (b) Unconstrained Firms
Figure 2.1: The figure shows the supply of capital curves faced by two hypothetical firms, both
currently holding k units of capital. The firm on the left is financially constrained. The firm on the right
is financially unconstrained.
The capital supply curve is not readily observable, such that measuring financial constraints
precisely is empirically challenging. Therefore, the literature instead attempts to infer the
elasticity of the capital supply curve indirectly, by looking at what managers say, firm
performance and characteristics, and the action managers take, i.e. pay out dividends or
obtain a credit rating. We note that capital markets comprise of both debt and equity
markets. A firm may for example find that that it is unable to issue bonds or shares in
public markets but is able to obtain debt financing through syndicate bank loans at a
reasonable cost, which in turn means that the firm is not financially constrained.
With a more precise definition of financial constraints in hand, we turn to the relationship
between financial constraints and risk. Livdan et al. (2009) link financial constraints, firm
risk and expected stock returns theoretically by extending the neoclassical investment
framework to incorporate retained earnings, debt, costly equity, and collateral constraints
on debt capacity. They define firms as financially constrained when there is a gap between
a firms optimal investment and its ability to obtain the necessary funding. A key result
of their model is that collateral constraints prevents firms from financing all desired
investments, which restricts the flexibility of firms in smoothing dividend streams in the
face of aggregate shocks, thereby increasing firm risk. Specifically, it is the inflexibility
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caused by financial constraints which generate an independent source of real risk.
2.2 Financial Constraints and Business Cycles
In this section we provide an overview of the literature linking financial constraints and
business cycles. Several researchers have modelled the effect of financing imperfections
on business cycles(see Bernanke et al. (1996) for a review), chief among them Gertler
and Bernanke (1989)’s agency-cost model. These models typically show that asymmetric
information gives rise to agency costs, causing some firms to be more financially constrained
than others, affecting investment and thereby linking the real- and financial sides of an
economy. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) calibrate Bernanke and Gertler’s model and find
that it replicates the empirical fact that output displays positive autocorrelation at short
horizons, indicating that financial constraints may be an important propagation and
amplification mechanism.
The connection between business cycles and financial constraints can be traced back
to Townsend (1979)’s costly verification problem. In his model, entrepreneurs need to
borrow from lenders to finance projects. However, only entrepreneurs can freely observe
the realized return of their projects. Lenders can observe the return by purchasing a
costly audit. If the lenders find auditing necessary, they will increase the cost of capital
to cover the increased auditing cost, driving a wedge between the entrepreneurs internal
and external cost of capital. Of particular interest is the case of two possible payoff states,
one low and one high. In the high payoff state, the project output is enough to cover the
cost of capital in full, leaving the rest to the entrepreneur. In the low state, the output is
not enough to cover the cost, such that the entrepreneur is bankrupt. Townsend (1979)
shows that more auditing is necessary when
1. The input required to complete a project is high. This means the entrepreneur must
borrow more, which means repayment in the good state is higher. As a result, the
entrepreneur has an increased incentive to lie about the project outcome, such that
he can claim a larger part of the output to himself. As a result, lenders must spend
more on costly auditing.
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2. The cost of auditing is high. In this case the lenders need more resources to pay the
audit costs, which means they require a higher payment in the good state to cover
these costs, which again incentivizes the entrepreneur to lie.
3. The difference in output between the high and low states is large. This will also
incentivize the entrepreneur to lie in the high state.
Auditing costs in this model represent agency costs in a general sense. Agency costs
arise when lenders (‘principles’) are unable to ensure that borrowers (‘agents’) act in the
lender’s best interests.
Gertler and Bernanke (1989) embed the costly state verification model in a real business
cycle framework with overlapping generations. This information asymmetry makes the
Modigliani-Miller theorem inapplicable. They show that the condition of borrowers’
balance sheets, i.e. net worth, is a source of output dynamics. The steps in the chain are
typically described as follows
1. A positive productivity shock hits the economy, increasing entrepreneurs labor
income and savings.
2. With higher savings, i.e. higher net worth, entrepreneurs borrow less to finance
projects. This reduces the cost of monitoring and thus, the cost of capital.
3. Lower costs of capital result in entrepreneurs receiving higher payoffs from projects,
which increases their net worth. This means they require less borrowing to fund the
next project, again lowering the cost of capital, resulting in a financial accelerator
effect.
4. With more projects completed, capital increases and the marginal product of capital
decreases until the entrepreneurs are indifferent to saving or doing projects again.
The essence of Gertler and Bernanke (1989)’s model is that when there is asymmetric
information, agency costs depend on the net worth of the borrower. This has two main
macroeconomic implications. First, we should see a decline in agency costs and thus
financial constraints in expansions and a rise in recessions as borrower net worth is likely
to be procyclical. They show that this is sufficient to introduce investment fluctuations
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and cyclical persistence into an environment exhibiting neither of these characteristics
when agency costs are not present. Second, real fluctuations can now be initiated by
shocks to borrower net wort which are independent of aggregate output. If the price of a
certain type of asset, for example an oil rig, falls in response to environmental concerns
and the rigs are used as collateral, then there is a decline in borrower net worth. The
agency costs associated with lending to the rig owners then increase, resulting in a fall in
investment, which in turn may have negative effects on aggregate demand and supply.
Hall (2001), in reviewing the literature of models embedding asymmetric information,
find that there are two key transmission mechanisms between financial constraints and
business cycles
1. Corporate cash flow. For example, a negative aggregate shock will cause a decline
in cash flows, which will raise the proportion of projects that must be financed from
external funds. For financially constrained firms this will increase expected agency
costs and the external finance premium, reducing investment and subsequent output,
exacerbating the downturn.
2. Asset prices. A tightening of monetary policy or a negative productivity shock
will reduce the demand for physical capital, leading to a decline in asset prices.
This reduces the value of collateral available to back loans and raises the external
finance premium, which in turn reduces current investment and subsequent output.
Forward-looking asset prices such as stocks will decline as expectations of lower
future cash flows are internalized, again exacerbating the downturn.
An important question in which there has yet to emerge a consensus, is whether financial
constraints bind more in expansions or downturns. Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Kashyap
et al. (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) all show that credit constraints seem to bind
more during recessions or when monetary policy is tight. On the other hand, researchers
also argue that during recessions, investment opportunities are generally poorer and
therefore external financing does not represent a binding constraint. They argue that it is
in good times, when there are plenty of positive NPV projects, that financing frictions
hinder the performance of constrained firms the most. Livdan et al. (2009) show that
partial equilibrium investment models cannot generate procyclical financial constraints
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because they typically assume constant discount factors. This means that aggregate
and firm-specific shocks affect investment symmetrically. However, using a stochastic
discount rate, they show that financial constraints are procyclical. Empirically, Campello
and Chen (2010) find that financially constrained firms’ real earnings- and investment
growth decline more than those of unconstrained firms in response to adverse changes in
macroeconomic and credit market conditions, supporting the view that constraints bind
more in downturns. Furthermore, Gomes et al. (2003) show that the implied shadow price
of new funds is procyclical in several well-known general equilibrium models (e.g. Gertler
and Bernanke (1989); Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Bernanke et al. (1999)).
2.3 The Financial Constraint Factor
In this section we give a brief review of asset pricing theory, which will motivate both
why financially constrained firms should earn a risk premium over unconstrained firms
and our empirical method of identifying the financial constraint factor. Finally, we review
empirical evidence on the existence of a financial constraint factor.
2.3.1 Asset Pricing
The value of an asset depends on the delay and of the risk of its future payments (Cochrane
(2009)). Cochrane advocates a discount factor view of asset pricing, summarizing its the
core concepts in two equations4
pt = E(mt+1xt+1) (2.2)
mt+1 = f(data, parameters) (2.3)
where pt is the time t asset price, xt+1 is the next period asset payoff and mt+1 is the
stochastic discount factor. For stocks, the one-period payoff is the next period asset price
plus dividends xt+1 = pt+1 + dt+1, where xt+1 is a random variable since investors do not
know the future value of the investments. Investors are however assumed to be able to
assess the probability of possible outcomes. Furthermore, xt+1 is the experienced value of
the asset payoff at time t+1 to a common investor, which can be modeled through a utility
4See Cochrane (2009) for details on the methodology.
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function. The utility function is defined over current and future values of consumption,
and typically assumed to be neo-classical, taking the general form
U(ct, ct+1) = u(ct) + βEt[u(ct+1)] (2.4)
where β is the discount factor, u(ct) is the utility from consuming ct units at time t, and
Et[u(ct+1)] is the time t expected next period utility. By maximizing the utility function,
Eq.2.4, subject to the budget constraints
ct = et − ptξ
ct+1 = et+1 + xt+1ξ
(2.5)
where e is the original consumption level (if the investor bought none of the asset), and ξ
is the amount of the asset he chooses to buy, we get the asset pricing formula
pt = Et
[
β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
xt+1
]
(2.6)
This formulation illustrates the role of investor risk aversion and impatience. Using the
definition of covariance and substituting in the risk-free rate equation5 one can rewrite
Eq.2.6 as
pt =
Et(xt)
Rft
+
cov[βu′(ct+1), xt+1]
u′(ct)
(2.7)
Eq.2.7 links investors desire smooth consumption and an assets ability to smooth
consumption. We see that asset prices rise with the covariation of the investor’s future
marginal utility and the assets future payoff, such that the higher the payoff in bad times,
the higher the price. A key aspect of asset pricing is that investors should be compensated
for taking systematic risk. Cochrane illustrates this through a special case of the basic
asset pricing formula, pt = Et(mt+1xt+1)
1 = Et(mt+1Rt+1) (2.8)
where Rt+1 is an assets gross return. Eq.2.8 formulates asset returns in terms of
consumption with the price normalized to one. Expanding the expectation, Eq.2.8
5See Cochrane (2009) section 1 for further elaboration.
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can be written as
1 = Et(mt+1)Et(R
i
t+1) + Covt(mt+1, R
i
t+1) (2.9)
and using Rft = 1Et(mt+1) we can rewrite Eq.2.9 as
Et(R
i
t)−Rft = −
Covt[u
′(ct+1), Rit+1]
Et[u′(ct+1)]
(2.10)
Eq.2.10 is the standard asset pricing formula, which tells us that assets which have payoffs
that covary positively with the state of the economy must compensate with a positive risk
premium to motivate investors to hold them. According to Cochrane, all asset pricing
models amount to different functions of the stochastic discount factor mt+1. Factor pricing
models attempt to model investors marginal utility in terms of indirect variables. They
specify that the stochastic discount factor is a linear function of a set of proxies
mt+1 = a+ bAf
A
t+1 + bBf
B
t+1 + . . . (2.11)
where fi are factors and a, bi are parameters. A key factor model in the literature is the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965),
which can be written as
mt+1 = a+ bR
W
t+1, (2.12)
where RWt+1 is the rate of return on a claim to total wealth, often proxied by a broad-based
stock portfolio. By expanding the model with size and book-to-market risk factors, Fama
and French (1992) arrive at the three-factor model,6 which has subsequently become
a standard asset pricing model in the literature. In a similar fashion to Eq.2.11, the
three-factor model is typically formulated as
Rjt −Rft = αjt + β1(RMt −Rft ) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εjt (2.13)
There have been many extensions and variations of such factor models. The most common
factors are usually related to firm or stock characteristics such as book-to-market or
earnings-price ratios (Basu (1977, 1983), Fama and French (1992, 2006)), firm size (Banz
6Their research suggests that the market beta does not explain the cross-section of average returns,
and find that including size as measured by market equity (ME) and book-to-market factors provide a
better characterization of the cross-section of average stock returns for their sample period (1963-1990).
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(1981) and Reinganum (1981)), co-skew with the market portfolio (Harvey and Siddique
(2000)), liquidity (Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)), default risk (Vassalou and Xing (2004)),
volatility (Ang et al. (2006)), and profitability and investment (Fama and French (2015)).
To relate factor pricing models to financial constraints, note Livdan et al. (2009)’s
theoretical result that financial constraints cause cash flows and dividends to vary in
a procyclical fashion; a result empirically supported by Campello and Chen (2010).
According to the asset pricing theory just reviewed, this procyclical variation means a
financial constraint factor should exist, and that it should be an explanatory variable
in asset pricing models. Since factors are interpreted as linear proxies of the stochastic
discount factor, the factors should be linearly independent. Thus, if the constraint factor
is indeed linearly independent, regressing it on standard asset pricing models should
result in a positive and significant intercept. Lamont et al. (2001) regress the financial
constraint factor on several asset pricing models7 and find that the financial constraint
factor generates a significant positive intercept in each model. They therefore add the
constraint factor to the Fama-French five-factor model and show that two corporate finance
anomalies - IPO’s and dividend omissions - are partially explained by the constraint factor.
2.3.2 Evidence of the Financial Constraint Factor
Generally, the literature points to the existence of a financial constraint factor although
the results have been mixed. Lamont et al. (2001) find that the stock returns of financially
constrained firms are on average lower than the stock returns of unconstrained firms,
however, their estimates are not significant. Whited and Wu (2006) use an alternative
index and find that constrained firms earn higher average returns than less constrained
firms, although this difference is also insignificant. Campello and Chen (2010) find that
constrained firms earn a significant risk premium over unconstrained firms and show
that the results of Lamont et al. (2001) can be attributed to the use of a single financial
constraint measure and their specific sample period.
Livdan et al. (2009) show theoretically that financially constrained firms should earn
higher expected returns than less financially constrained firms. Furthermore, they find
that constrained firms typically have a small scale of production and low firm-specific
7These include the CAPM, and Fama-French three- and five-factor models.
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productivity. These theoretical predictions lend support to Chan and Chen (1991)
and Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), who find that small firms and relatively
unprofitable firms earn higher average returns than larger more profitable firms. They
interpret their evidence as suggesting that these firms are more adversely affected by
lower liquidity in tight credit market conditions. Livdan et al. (2009) also find that after
controlling for size, the significance of the financial constraint premium disappears. These
results are largely consistent with the evidence of Lamont et al. (2001) and Whited and Wu
(2006). They find that the financial constraint premium is significant in univariate sorts
but not in bivariate sorts, likely a result of financial constraints being jointly determined
with size and book-to-market in equilibrium. Finally, a new branch of research on financial
constraints has emerged, where textual analysis is used together with annual reports
and public company filings to identify financially constrained firms. Using this approach,
Buehlmaier and Whited (2018) find that financially constrained firms earn a positive risk
premium and that the premium cannot be explained by the Fama and French (2015)
five-factor model.
2.4 Financial Constraints Identification in Practice
There are no agreed upon definitions of financial constraints which can be readily applied
directly to data to classify firms as financially constrained or unconstrained. The literature
has therefore resorted to applying various measures of financial constraints to classify
firms. In this section we give an overview of the most common methods.
The earliest empirical studies of the real effects of financial constraints where by Fazzari
et al. (1988), who employed investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure of financial
constraints, a methodology which has since been extensively challenged.8 Lamont et al.
(2001) use the qualitative studies of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to form an index used
to classify firms into discrete categories depending on their estimated degree of financial
constraints. The index is a linear combination of five accounting ratios, where a higher
index value indicates that the firm is more financially constrained. The index is given by
8See Kaplan and Zingales (2000, 1995) and Cleary et al. (2007).
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the equation
KZjt = −1.002CFjt + 3.139TLTDjt− 39.368TDIVjt− 1.315CASHjt + 0.283Qjt (2.14)
where CF is cash flow to total assets, TLTDjt is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,
TDIVjt is the ratio of total dividends to assets, CASHjt is the ratio of liquid assets to
total assets and Qjt is Tobin’s q.
Another widely used index is the WW-index constructed by Whited and Wu (2006).
The index is constructed via a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of
an investment Euler equation. Their model predicts that financial constraints affect the
intertemporal substitution of investment today via the shadow price of scarce external
funds. Their index is given by
WWjt = −0.091CFjt − 0.062DIV POSjt + 0.021TLTDjt − 0.044LNTAjt
+0.102ISGjt − 0.035SGjt
(2.15)
where CFjt is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, DIV POSjt is an indicator that takes
the value of one if the firm pays cash dividends, TLTDjt is the ratio of long-term debt
to total assets, LNTAjt is the natural log of total assets, ISGjt is the firm’s three-digit
industry sales growth and SGjt is firm sales growth.
Another prevalent measure in the literature is the Size-Age-Index published by Hadlock
and Pierce (2010). To test and compare the relative merits of the KZ- and WW-Indexes,
Hadlock and Pierce use textual analysis on SEC filings to classify firms as constrained and
unconstrained. Using this categorization, they estimate an ordered logit model predicting
constraints as a function of different quantitative factors. Comparing their categorization
to the KZ-Index, they find that the correlation is essentially zero, hence they advise
against the use of the KZ-Index. For the WW-Index they find a higher correlation but
assign most of the correlation to the fact that the index includes firm size. The main
finding of the paper, however, is the relevance of size and age in categorizing firms as
constrained. They propose an index solely based on the non-linear relationship between
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size, age and financial constraints, which is given by
SAjt = (0.737× Sizejt) + (0.043× Size2jt)(0.040× Agejt) (2.16)
where Sizejt is defined as the logarithm of a firms market capitalization and Agejt is
defined as Min(Agejt, 37).
A simpler and more practical approach is the use of proxies. By definition, a variable is a
good proxy if it is highly correlated with financial constraints (Silva and Carreira (2012)).
A good measure of financial constraints should reflect that financial constraints are firm-
specific and time-varying. Examples of commonly used proxies include cash-flow metrics,
cash-holdings, size, age, exports, research and development intensity, leverage, dividend
payout ratio and group membership (Silva and Carreira (2012)). Several researchers
(see for example Campello and Chen (2010) and Lamont et al. (2001)) have resorted to
aggregating such proxies into composite measures in order to increase the robustness of
their classifications.
An unsettled debate in the literature is the relationship between cash holdings and financial
constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that low cash holdings are associated with
financial constraints, as constrained firms must use more of their internal cash-holdings
to finance projects. On the other hand, high cash holdings may reflect precautionary
savings from firms which do not have easy access to external capital. Several economists
find evidence of the latter. For instance, Acharya et al. (2012) find a positive correlation
between corporate cash holdings, credit spreads and the long-term probability of default.9
Another example includes McVanel and Perevalov (2008)’s study of Canadian non-financial
firms in the period 1980-2006, where they conclude that the desired level of cash holdings
is likely to be higher for financially constrained firms.
The literature is also divided on the relationship between leverage and financial constraints.
Both Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that leverage and
financial constraints are positively correlated. On the other hand, McVanel and Perevalov
(2008) find evidence of a negative relationship between a firm’s leverage ratio and its degree
of financial constraints. They argue that firms with high leverage have been able to borrow
9See also Opler et al. (1999) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
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at some point, and thus positive leverage may indicate that a firm is unconstrained, a
result found by several other researchers(see for example Cleary (1999)). Farre-Mensa and
Ljungqvist (2016) use dividends, credit ratings, the WW-Index, SA-Index and KZ-Index
to classify firms as constrained and unconstrained. For all classification criteria except
the KZ-Index, they find that constrained firms are less levered and hold more cash.
In the same paper, Ferra-Mensa and Ljungqvist point out that many popular measures
of financial constraints which are based on accounting data, such as the KZ-Index and
WW-Index, are likely flawed. Using US data they show that firms classified as constrained
by these measures are able to borrow more when optimal, maintain borrowing levels when
banks lending in its home state are hit with a tax shock that shifts the local supply of bank
loans, and raise equity and at the same time increase its payouts to shareholders. As these
behavioral patterns are not consistent with firms which are financially constrained, they
advise caution in blindly applying such indexes to classify firms as financially constrained.
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3 Data Construction and Description
In this section we describe our our choice of variables and how we construct the various
data sets. To better understand the data construction process, it will be useful to first
restate the general steps of our analysis. We start by forming portfolios of constrained
and unconstrained firms using various classification schemes. The median real earnings-
and investment growth of these portfolios are then regressed on macroeconomic and credit
market variables. We then test if there is a difference in stock market returns between
constrained and unconstrained firms by calculating their return difference, creating a
financial constraint factor. The financial constraint factor is then regressed on the same
macroeconomic and credit market variables as in the first regressions. Finally, we test if
the financial constraint factor can be priced using various asset pricing models.
3.1 Macroeconomic Variables
The macroeconomic variables we use include the unemployment rate, industrial production
and the oil price, which serve as proxies for the state of the economy. We use industrial
production and the unemployment rate to make our results comparable to those of the US,
as reported by Campello and Chen (2010). To correct for the fact that the macroeconomic
movements and changes in the stance of monetary policy often coincide, we have included
Norges Bank’s key policy rate as a proxy for monetary policy (MP). To incorporate specific
characteristics of the Norwegian economy, we will also include the NOK trade-weighted
currency index and the US ten-over-two year yield spread as control variables. Before
discussing our choice of credit market variables, we briefly explain why we include the oil
price, the NOK trade-weighted currency index and the US yield-spread.
We include the oil price because several studies show that the state of the Norwegian
economy and the oil price are closely connected. For example, Bjørnland (2000) use a
structural vector autoregression (VAR) model to analyze the linkages between energy
prices and the aggregate economy of four OECD countries. They find that for Norway,
a positive oil price shock increases output at all horizons, although the results are not
significant in the long run. Similarly, Mork et al. (1994) finds that the Norwegian economy
benefits significantly from oil price increases but does not seem to be hurt by oil price
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declines.
We include the NOK trade-weighted currency index and the US ten-over-two year yield
spread to isolate macroeconomic conditions in Norway from foreign disturbances. For
example, by comparing the studies of Furlanetto et al. (2013) and Aastveit et al. (2011),
Aastveit et al. (2013) conclude that foreign disturbances explain more than 50% of the
fluctuations in the Norwegian macroeconomic variables. Specifically, we include the NOK
trade-weighted index to account for exogenous fluctuations in import and export prices.
The index is calculated on the basis of NOK-exchange rates against the currencies of
Norway’s 25 main trading partners.10 We include the US ten-over-two year yield spread to
account for business cycle variations in Norway’s most important economic counterparts.
It is well documented that business cycles in the US are correlated with those of other
major economies such as the Eurozone area and the UK, which means that including
the US yield spread should account at least in part for these economies as well.11 An
important reason for choosing the US yield spread is that it is available from 1996. We
are unable to find reliable economic indicators for the Eurozone, the UK, Germany, China
and other Norwegian trade partners, which stretches back to 1996. An alternative would
be to shorten the time-frame of our analysis to account for the lack of economic data,
however, we view the US yield spread as adequate in capturing business cycle variations
outside the US, and the loss of information by shortening our time horizon as too costly.
3.2 Credit Market Variables
We use the Norwegian two-year swap spread12 and the credit-to-GDP growth rates as
proxies for the credit market conditions.13 For robustness, we also run the regressions
using the NIBOR-spread and Norges Bank’s credit-gap series as proxies for credit market
conditions, and note that the results do not change meaningfully, however the coefficients
10Geometric average using the OECD’s trade weights, chain-linked. The index is set at 1990=100.
Not seasonally adjusted. A rising index value denotes a depreciating krone exchange rate.
11See for example Benedictow and Johansen (2005).
12An interest rate swap is a contract between two parties to exchange one stream of interest payments
for another over a specified period. Regular interest rate swaps exchange fixed-rate payments, i.e. the
swap rate, for floating rate payments based on benchmark interest rates such as the LIBOR or NIBOR.
The swap spread is the difference between the swap rate and the yield on a government bond of the same
maturity.
13Credit is calculated as the sum of C2 households and C3 non-financial enterprises (all non-financial
enterprises pre-1995) for mainland Norway.
20 3.2 Credit Market Variables
are smaller and less significant,14 see appendix section A4. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
similarities in the measures.
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the similarities between the Credit-to-GDP Growth, NIBOR spread
and the two-year swap spread. The NIBOR- and swap spreads are illustrated via the line graphs
(RHS), while the credit-to-GDP growth is illustrated via the columns (LHS).
We here briefly explain our choice of credit variables. Generally, higher swap spreads
indicate increased risk aversion in the market; when investors seek to hedge interest rate
risk through swaps, the swap spread widens. Furthermore, the swap spread is an important
indicator of how both default and liquidity risk influence security returns (Liu et al. (2002)).
Thus, to gauge investor sentiment in the credit markets, the swap spread seems to be a
good measure. We use the credit-to-GDP ratio as it is one of the four indexes used by
Norges Bank to assess financial imbalances in Norway (NorgesBank (2019)). Periods of
easing credit conditions should result in the credit-to-GDP ratio increasing while periods
of general distress should see it decreasing, as we see in Figure 3.1.
14The NIBOR spread is calculated by subtracting the yield on three-month government bills from the
three-month NIBOR rate. The Credit-Gap is calculated as the the total credit of mainland Norway as a
share of mainland GDP.
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3.3 Data Construction
We use three main data sources: accounting data, stock market data and economic data.
The accounting and stock market data are collected from the Compustat Global database,
while the economic variables are collected from Datastream, Macrobond and Norges Bank.
The variable names, descriptions, ID codes and database are listed in Table 3.2. We start
by constructing three sperate datasets of stock market, accounting, and economic data.
The economic dataset is then merged into the accounting dataset. Finally, we merge the
stock market and accounting datasets, making sure that both sets include the same firms
over the same periods, leaving us with one monthly and one yearly dataset. The data
construction steps are listed in Table 3.1 and described in detail below.
Table 3.1: This table illustrates the development of the number of observations in our sample
from the original sample to the final data set. See section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for a detailed description
of each step.
Panel A: Security data Observations Companies Months
Number Diff Number Number
Compustat file 50951 415 287
Day > 25 48506 -2445 413 287
Return calculation 40231 -8275 406 286
Omit penny stocks 38064 -2167 403 286
Omit financial companies 30184 -7880 311 286
Merge with macrodata 29853 -331 311 279
Panel B: Accounting data Observations Companies Years
Number Diff Number Number
Compustat file 4005 377 24
Omit financial companies 3993 -12 375 24
Omit at < 0 3971 -22 375 24
Omit lt < 0 3967 -4 375 24
Omit BE < 0 3850 -117 375 24
Omit empty classification variables 2978 -872 355 22
Panel C: Merged file Observations Companies Years
Number Diff Number Number
Merge files 2048 272 22
Allign ME at june with t - 1 1898 -150 253 22
Match with return data 20613 253 257*
* Months
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Table 3.2: An overview of the sample variables. The ID variables column reports the variable
names from their respective database.
Variables Content Database
ID Variables
datedate Date Compustat
conm Company Name Compustat
gvkey Global Company Key Compustat
Security variables
ajexdi Adjustment Factor Compustat
cshoc Shares Outstanding Compustat
iid Issue ID Compustat
prccd Daily Close Price Compustat
tpci Issue Type Code Compustat
Accounting variables
fyear Fiscal Year Compustat
fyr Fiscal Year-End Month Compustat
at Total Assets Compustat
lt Total Liabilities Compustat
revt Total Revenue Compustat
seq Stockholders Equity Compustat
txdb Total Deferred Taxes Compustat
xint Total Interest Epense Compustat
xopr Total Operating Expenses Compustat
Macro and credit variables
norate0001 Norges Bank Policy Rate Datastream
no2ygov Goverment Benchmark 2 Year Yield Macrobond
nok2yswap 2 Year Swap Rate Macrobond
NIBOR One Month Norwegian Interbank Rate Norges Bank
no3mnibor Three Month Norwegian Interbank Rate Macrobond
noprod001 Monthly Industrial Production Norway Datastream
nolama0546 Monthly Unemployment Rate Norway Datastream
Credit/GDP Indicator of Financial Imbanances from Norgres Bank Norges Bank
wocaes 0074 Daily Brent ICE Close Macrobond
NWXTW..NF Trade Weighted NOK Index, 1990=100 Datastream
nopric0001 Consumer Price Index, 2015=100 Macrobond
USAIYN.R US YIELD CURVE (10y minus 2y) Datastream
3.3.1 Data Construction – The Economic Dataset
We merge data from Datastream, Norges Bank and Macrobond, creating a dataset
containing both macroeconomic and credit market variables. The variables we use are
listed under macro and credit variables in Table 3.2. The variables noky2swap, no2ygov
and NIBOR rates are daily price series, which we convert into monthly series by extracting
the end-of-month observations. For consistency, we follow the procedure outlined in
section 3.3.2, defining the reported last day of the month to be end-of-month observations
if they fall on the 26th or later. Credit-to-GDP is reported quarterly, while the remaining
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variables are reported monthly. The Norwegian two-year swap rate is the shortest time
series, starting August 1995, which becomes the starting point for the dataset. We merge
all the individual data series and omit observations before August 1995.
3.3.2 Data Construction – The Stock Market Dataset
We start by extracting daily stock market data from the Compustat Global database.
General practice in the asset pricing literature is to test factor models using monthly stock
market returns, see Fama and French (2015). We therefore convert the daily data into a
dataset of monthly observations. There are several instances where a stocks’ last recorded
trading day differs from the final day of the month. We sidestep the issue by defining the
reported last day of the month to be end-of-month observations if they fall on the 26th or
later.15 Monthly individual stock returns are then calculated as
rjt =
pjt
adjjt
pjt−1
adjjt−1
− 1 (3.1)
where pjt is the monthly closing price of stock i and adjjt is the Compustat adjustment
factor which adjusts prices for stock splits and dividends. We omit return values which
are exactly zero as this is an indication of improper reporting. Looking at the subset of
firms which have monthly returns of exactly zero confirms our suspicions as they typically
have no recorded accounting data in the relevant period. We remove all observations with
a share price under one NOK for two reasons. First, the Oslo Stock Exchange delists
firms with a share price under one NOK for more than six months (OsloBørs (2019)).
Second, due to the low price of these stocks, a small increase or decrease in the share
price can cause large movements in the return calculations, skewing the results. Following
Fama and French (1992), we exclude financial firms because high leverage for these firms
typically does not have the same interpretation as for non-financial firms, where higher
leverage signals financial distress.
15We find that the number of observations with an end-of-month day lower than the 26th is significantly
lower than the number of observations with an end-of-month day higher than the 26th.
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We follow the asset pricing literature (see for example Aharoni et al. (2013) or Novy-Marx
(2013)) and do a 0.5 percent and 99.5 percent winsorization16 of the dataset. Table 3.3
provides the sample characteristics before and after the sample adjustment.
Table 3.3: This table shows the sample characteristics of the end-of-month stock returns for the
original and adjusted datasets covering the period of July 1996 to December 2018. The individual stock
returns are calculated by Eq.3.1. The adjusted sample is winsorized with 0.5 and 99.5 percent. Both
samples exclude return values of exactly zero. In addition, penny stocks, firms with negative book-equity,
assets and debt, as well as firms without sufficient accounting data to construct the ranking variables are
omitted.
Original Sample Adjusted Sample
Mean 0.98% 0.70%
Min -93.93% -45.83%
Max 987.46% 66.90%
Stdv 17.62% 13.12%
Kurtosis 400.00 2.97
Skewness 9.96 0.62
JB test p-value 0.00 0.00
The Jarque-Bera test17 indicates that neither the returns of the original nor adjusted
sample are drawn from normal distributions, which is in line with most other findings
concerning stock return distributions (see for example Rachev et al. (2005) for an overview).
Figure 3.2 plots the sample return distribution as a histogram together with a theoretical
normal distribution which has the same mean and standard deviation as the sample data.
We see that neither of the sample distributions quite fit their corresponding theoretical
normal distribution.
16Winsorizing amounts to setting all outliers to a specified percentile of the data to increase the
robustness of the applied estimators.
17The null hypothesis of a Jarque-Bera test is that the population the sample is drawn from has zero
skew and zero excess kurtosis, which is the case for a normal distribution.
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(a) Original sample (b) Adjusted sample
Figure 3.2: Sample return distribution for the original and adjusted sample. Return is calculated by
Eq.3.1. The adjusted sample is winsorized with 0.5 and 99.5 percent. Both samples exclude return values
of exactly zero. In addition, penny stocks, firms with negative book-equity, assets and debt, as well as
firms without sufficient accounting data to construct the ranking variables are omitted.
3.3.3 Data Construction – The Accounting Dataset
We extract full year accounting data for Norwegian firms with fiscal year-end in December
from the Compustat Global database. Financial companies are omitted from the dataset,
as is done for the stock market dataset. Firms with negative total assets or total leverage
are also omitted. Negative total assets and negative leverage are not possible and are
therefore signs of improper accounting. We also omit firms with negative book-equity as
we use an operating profitability measure which divides operating profits by book-equity.
Distressed firms are typically unprofitable, which may result in having both negative
book-equity and negative operating earnings, giving a positive value for the operating
profitability measure. The result would be to blend profitable and unprofitable firms,
distorting the results. Furthermore, omitting negative book-equity firms will help us
isolate the results on financial constraints from the effects of bankruptcy or financial
distress.
In section 4.2 we describe the ranking variables we construct to classify firms as constrained
and unconstrained. We omit observations which have empty ranking variables as a result
of missing accounting data, and then merge the economic and accounting datasets.
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3.3.4 Data Construction – The Complete Datasets and Timeline
We merge the stock market and accounting datasets such that our sample only contains
firms which have both fundamental- and security data. This merged file is the final
stock market dataset, which contains both monthly stock market data, monthly economic
data, and yearly accounting data. From this dataset we calculate yearly averages of the
economic data and then extract these yearly averages together with the yearly accounting
data to create the final accounting dataset.
The start of our sample is restricted by the two-year swap spread variable, which starts
August 1995. Since the holding period starts in July of each year, we investigate returns
from July 1996 to December 2018. As described in detail in section 4.1, several accounting
variables in our analysis require a two-year time lag. We therefore collect data from the
Compustat global database starting from fiscal year-end 1993. The number of unique
firms in our sample over time is illustrated in the appendix section A1.
3.4 Industry Sector Classifications and
Reclassifications
The Compustat Global database provides Standard Industrial Classification codes for
all firms. We use the codes to divide the sample into four industry groups including oil
companies, transportation companies, manufacturing companies and other companies.
Table 3.4 provides an overview of the SIC codes used in each industry group. The original
column states the original range of SIC codes for an industry group. The SIC Inn column
lists SIC codes we add to an industry group while SIC Out lists the SIC codes we remove
from an industry group.
Oil companies are not an individual group under SIC classifications but rather a collection
of smaller groups under the general category of mining. We define oil companies more
broadly to include both oil and exploration companies as well as the oil service sector.
This entails reclassifying firms which were classified as transportation or manufacturing
companies to oil companies, as well as selecting the relevant SIC code groups from the
mining group category. Firms not classified in the oil, transportation or manufacturing
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group are placed in the other companies’ group. Other firms are also directly reclassified,
see appendix section A8 for further details. We report the descriptive statistics of each
industry sector and the number of observations classified as constrained or unconstrained
per industry group for each classification scheme, see appendix Table A8.1 and A8.2.
Table 3.4: This table gives an overview of the original and reclassified SIC codes. The Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are four-digit codes that indicate the company’s type of business
(Securities and Commission (2019)). The Original column reports the SIC codes of firms originally
classified in the denoted industry sector. The SIC Inn column reports the SIC codes which are added to
the denoted sector, while SIC Out reports the SIC codes which are taken out of the relevant industry
group. For example, firms with the SIC code 4400 were originally classified as transportation companies,
however we reclassify them as oil companies becasue firms in this category are offshore suppliers and
seismic companies, and we define the oil sector to include oil service companies.
Oil Companies Transportation Companies Manufacturing Companies
Original SIC Inn SIC Out Original SIC Inn SIC Out Original SIC Inn SIC Out
1311 4400 4000-4999 1382 4400 2000-3999 900 3730
1381 3533 1382 4812 3533
1389 8711 3730 4911 2711
1700 2911 4832 2911
4899
4931
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4 Methodology
4.1 Portfolio Construction and Variable Definitions
In this section we explain our portfolio construction and updating process, and define all
relevant variables. We start by constructing portfolios of constrained and unconstrained
firms based on four financial constraint classification schemes which we detail below
in section 4.2. Following the asset pricing literature (see for example Fama and
French (1992)), we update these portfolios at the end of June each year, resulting in a
twelve-month holding period over which, we calculate monthly returns. This approach
ensures that the information we use to explain future returns is known, avoiding a “look
ahead bias”. The financial constraint classification schemes use accounting variables
and firm age as inputs, which are calculated at fiscal-year end of year t − 1, as well as
firm size which is calculated at the end of June year t. Real investment- and operating
earnings growth are calculated from fiscal year-end at time t − 2 to t − 1. We create
the Fama-French SMB, HML, CMA, RWA factor mimicking portfolios, see appendix
section A9, in a similar fashion to the constrained and unconstrained portfolios. Figure
4.1 illustrates the timeline and portfolio dynamics.
EndFyr t− 2 End fyr t− 1 Dec t− 1 June t June t+ 1
sizet = MEt
Portfolio Construction
Portfolio Update
Holding Period
B/Mt−1
InvestmentGrowtht
EarningsGrowtht
OPt
Sorting’
V ariablest
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the portfolio construction. For each financial constraint classification
scheme we construct portfolios of constrained and unconstrained firms. The portfolios are updated at the
end of June each year. The accounting variables and firm age are calculated at fiscal-year end of year
t− 1. Firm size is calculated at the end of June year t. Real investment- and operating earnings growth
are calculated from fiscal year-end at time t− 2 to t− 1. The portfolio is held for twelve months over
which we calculate monthly returns.
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We follow much of the asset pricing literature and report both value-weighted and equal-
weighted returns (see for example Fama and French (1993, 1992)). For a given portfolio of
stocks, the returns of the value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios are calculated as
RPFt =
n∑
j=1
rjt ×MEjt
MEPFt
(4.1)
RPFt =
1
n
n∑
j=1
rjt (4.2)
where RPFt is the average monthly return of a portfolio of n stocks, rjt is the monthly
return of stock j as calculated in Eq.3.1, MEjt the market capitalization of stock j and
MEPFt is the market capitalization of the portfolio.
For a detailed discussion on differences of value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios, see
Plyakha et al. (2014). We note that the choice of value-weighted against equal-weighted
is not linked to theoretical measurements of financial constraints, rather the choice simply
depends on how an investor prefers to rebalance the portfolio.
4.1.1 Financial Constraints Sorting Variables
These variables are used to create the various measures of financial constraints. They
include leverage, cash holdings, the interest coverage ratio, total assets, firm age, and size,
and are defined as follows
i. Leverage is defined as total debt at time t− 1 over total assets at time t− 1
total debtt−1
total assetst−1
(4.3)
ii. Cash holdings is defined as cash holdings at time t− 1 over total assets at time t− 1
cash holdingst−1
total assetst−1
(4.4)
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iii. Coverage ratio is defined as operating earnings at time t − 1 over total interest
expenses at time t− 1
EBITt−1
interest expensest−1
(4.5)
iv. Assets is defined as total assets at time t− 1
Total assetst−1 (4.6)
v. Age is defined as the number of years since the first trading day in our sample.18
vi. Size is defined as the market capitalization at the end of June of year t,
calculated as
Market capt = share pricet × shares outstandingt (4.7)
4.1.2 Fama-French Sorting Variables
In order to construct the Fama-French SMB, HML, CMA and RWA factors we must define
size, book-to-market, operating profitability and investment. They are defined as follows
i. Size is defined as in section 4.1.1, Eq.4.7.
ii. Book-to-market is defined as the ratio of a firms book equity at the end of
fiscal year t− 1 and its market equity at the end of December of year t− 1
B/Mt =
book equityt−1
market equityDect−1
(4.8)
where market equity (ME) is calculated as in Eq. 4.7 . Book equity is calculated as
Book equityt = stock holder equityt−1 + deferred taxest−1
+ investment tax creditt−1
(4.9)
18The Compustat Global Database provides as IPO variable which could be used to more accurately
calculate firm age, however it is either empty, wrong or contradictory for most firms in our sample.
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iii. Operating profitability is defined as operating profit less interest expenses relativity
to book equity, where all variables are measured at fiscal year-end t− 1
OPt =
total revenuest−1 − total operating expensest−1 − interest expensest−1
book equityt−1
(4.10)
V. Investment is defined as the book asset growth from year t− 2 to year t− 1
Investmentt =
total assetst−1 − total assetst−2
total assetst−2
(4.11)
4.2 Measures of Financial Constraints
In this section we detail the construction of our financial constraints classification criteria.
Our general approach to identifying financially constrained firms is to sort firms by
characteristics believed to be associated with financial constraints. As the literature has
yet to reach a consensus on which variables best measure financial constraints we resort
to using several measures. Specifically, we construct four measures of financial constraints
including size, the SA-index and the Composite I and Composite II Indexes. These
measures are used to form portfolios of constrained (C), middle (M), and unconstrained
(U) firms using 30% and 70% cutoff points.
4.2.1 Definition of the Classification Schemes
1. Size
At the end of June each year we classify each firm into three groups using that months
market capitalization with 30% and 70% cutoffs, where the firms in the lowest group are
classified as constrained and firms in the highest group are classified as unconstrained.
We define size for firm j as in section 4.1.1, Eq.4.7
Market capjt = share pricejt × shares outstandingjt (4.12)
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2. The SA Index
At the end of June each year we calculate the SA-Index score for all firms. Next, using 30%
and 70% cutoff points we classify each firm into one of three groups, where firms in the
highest group are ranked as constrained and firms in the lowest group as unconstrained.
The SA-Index score for firm j is given by
SAjt = (−0.737× Sizejt) + (0.043× Size2jt)− (0.04× Agejt) (4.13)
where Sizejt is defined as the natural logarithm of a firms market capitalization, while
Agejt is defined as in section 4.1.1.19
3. Composite I Index
At the end of June each year we separately sort firms based on: size, age, leverage, cash
holdings, coverage ratio and total assets using 20% quantile breakpoints. We then assign
a score from 1 to 5 for each of those rankings, with a lower number indicating a higher
likelihood of being financially constrained. The Composite I Index score for each firm j is
created by adding together the firms individual variable scores. Using the Composite I
Index scores we divide the sample into three groups using 30% and 70% cutoff points,
where firms in the lowest group are ranked as constrained and firms in the highest group
as unconstrained. Specifically, smaller firms, in terms of market size and total assets are
ranked as more constrained. Younger firms are ranked as more constrained. The lower
the leverage and coverage ratio and the higher the cash holdings, the more constrained
the firm is ranked.
As discussed in section 2.4, the literature is divided on how leverage and cash holdings are
related to financial constraints. We find it convincing that firms which are highly levered
but not in distress must have had access to external capital previously and are therefore
less likely to be truly constrained. Furthermore, we find it likely that constrained firms
will hold more cash in order to finance larger parts of projects using internal capital, as
external capital may be prohibitively expensive. Cash is likely also held as a precautionary
measure for the same reason.
19Hadlock and Pierce (2010) define Agejt as Min(Agejt, 37), due to the essentially flat relationship
between constraints and size/age for very large mature firms. We do not use this definition as our sample
period is too short.
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4. Composite II Index
The algorithm used to compute the Composite II Index is the same as that of Composite
I, however we reduce the variables to leverage, cash holdings and the coverage ratio.
Choice of classification schemes
Size is a standard measure of financial constraints (see for example Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) and Campello and Chen (2010) ). Furthermore, as Livdan et al. (2009) shows,
size and financial constraints are determined endogenously, which means although size is
not a pure measure of financial constraints, it should be closely correlated with financial
constraints, which is exactly what Lamont et al. (2001) find empirically. We note that size
has been linked to several other risk factors, including a stock market illiquidity premium,
and an information premium, see section 5.2 for details.
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that size and age are particularly useful predictors of
financial constraints, and that the relationship between financial constraints, size and
age are non-linear. For a more detailed description of the SA-Index, see section 2.4. We
note that the SA-Index is based on a specific functional form and that its coefficients are
estimated using a relatively small number of firms over a short period of time, suggesting
caution in applying the index blindly to our dataset. We therefore view our use of the
SA-Index as an exploratory investigation of the ability of US-estimated indexes to correctly
identify financial constraints outside the US.
The Composite I Index is simply a collection of firm-specific factors which have been
empirically documented to be associated with financial constraints. We find this measure
interesting because it combines firm characteristics, i.e. size and age, with information on
firm performance via accounting measures and management decisions in the form of asset
size and cash holdings. Furthermore, including leverage and the coverage ratio provides
information on how the firm is affected by variations in external borrowing costs.
In the Composite II Index, we limit the variables to firm-specific accounting measures for
two reasons. First, we exclude size and age because they are considered separately above.
Total assets are excluded because it is closely related to firm size. Second, this allows us
to test whether a firm’s capital structure and liquidity situation can be used to identify
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financially constraints.
4.2.2 Data Limitations
The Compustat reporting of cash flow statements and dividends for Norwegian companies
are poor. We are therefore unable to use accounting measures related to dividends or
the cash flow statement in the analysis. There are two drawdowns to this. First, as
several researchers point out, dividends and cash flows are some of the most important
variables in determining how financially constrained a firm is. Second, we are unable
to test benchmark indexes such as the KZ- and WW-Indexes. Despite the controversy
in blindly applying these indexes, using them would both allow a comparison with our
current constraint measures and test their fit to Norwegian data. The data issue can be
illustrated by constructing the KZ index, and creating a table similar to Table 3.1, see
appendix A7, Table A7.1, the sample size is almost halved.
Another data limitation is tied to the availability of credit metrics and ratings of Norwegian
companies. After shadow ratings were banned in 2016 Norwegian banks stopped publishing
credit ratings. The Compustat Global database includes a credit quality ranking from the
S&P ratings agency; however, the variable is empty for all Norwegian firms. Furthermore,
we were unable to obtain any aggregate credit indices. These limitations mean we are
unable to create financial constraint measures similar to those of Campello and Chen
(2010) and Lamont et al. (2001). This also means we are unable to measure credit market
conditions in a similar fashion, making our results less comparable to those of the US.
4.3 Do the Classification Criteria Measure Financial
Constraints?
Since we do not have an exact measure of financial constraints, but rather a set of proxies,
we seek to validate that the classification criteria measure financial constraints. We
validate the measures along three dimensions. First, we test if the classification schemes
measure the same thing. Second, we check if the characteristics of firms classified as
constrained and unconstrained match those previously found in the literature. Finally, we
test whether the classification schemes capture variations in the elasticity of the supply
4.3 Do the Classification Criteria Measure Financial Constraints? 35
curve of external capital.
The key findings in this section are that size captures, at least in part, financial constraints
and since the Composite I Index behaves similarly to size in the firms it classifies as
constrained, it too likely captures financial constraints. On the other hand, it seems
unlikely that the SA-Index correctly identifies financially constrained firms, while it is
unclear whether accounting variables alone, as characterized by the Composite II Index,
is enough to identify financial constraints.
4.3.1 Do the classification schemes measure the same thing?
To answer this question, we look at the overlap in constrained and unconstrained
classifications, which are reported in Table 4.1. If the classification schemes measure
the same thing then we should see a high number of overlapping classifications and a
low number of contradictory cases where a firm is labeled constrained by one measure
and unconstrained by another. We see that size and the Composite I Index are the
closest measures, while the Composite II Index and SA-Index have several contradictory
classifications. Furthermore, we see that the Composite II Index has the lowest number of
overlapping classifications.
Table 4.1: This table displays firm-year cross-classifications for the various criteria used to categorize
firms as either financially constrained or unconstrained. Firms are ranked independently at the end June
each year by the four applied measures; Size, SA-Index, Composite I and Composite II. See section 4.2
for an elaboration of the classification schemes. The sample period stretches from July 1996 to December
2018.
Financial Constraints Size SA-Index Composite I Composite II
Criteria (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
1. Size
Constrained (C) 554
Unconstrained (U) 560
2. SA-Index
Constrained (C) 302 79 548
Unconstrained (U) 70 276 560
3. Composite I
Constrained (C) 306 7 334 20 466
Unconstrained (U) 9 388 59 298 505
4. Composite II
Constrained (C) 202 76 229 82 327 6 462
Unconstrained (U) 97 180 73 153 4 244 400
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4.3.2 Do the characteristics of firms classified as constrained
and unconstrained match those previously found in the
literature?
As a reference point, we provide an overview of the full sample characteristics in Table
4.2. We see that the average yearly growth in real operating earnings has been negative,
while asset growth has been positive. Furthermore, on average, firms finance half of their
assets using debt.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of the full sample over the period July 1996 to December 2018. For
computation of the variables see section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Market capitalization and total assets are denoted
in MNOK.
Total Sample
Mean Stdv Median Min Max
Earnings growth -0.10 5.48 0.02 -92.98 64.26
Investment growth 0.30 2.60 0.04 -0.95 92.16
Market capitalization 18,883 105,179 1,284 14 1,875,589
Total assets 13,963 60,324 1,705 6 1,007,816
Debt-to-Assets 0.55 0.19 0.58 0.02 1.04
Book-to-Market 0.90 1.30 0.59 0.00 27.76
N 1854
Panel A and B of Table 4.3 provides an overview of the characteristics of the constrained
and unconstrained firms, as classified by each of the four classification schemes. We
see that for the size and Composite I classification schemes, constrained firms are less
profitable and invest less than unconstrained firms. These observations are in line with
Livdan et al. (2009)’s theoretical prediction as well as most empirical observations (see for
example Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). On the other hand, we note that both the SA-Index
and Composite II Index report that constrained firms are on average more profitable
and invest more than unconstrained firms, opposing the findings of both the size and
Composite I classification schemes.
In Table 4.7 we split our sample into five groups using firm size and 20% quantile
break-points, and report the associated characteristics of each portfolio. We see that
profitability, age, and the coverage ratio all decrease monotonically with firm size, while
the book-to-market values and cash holdings increase as firms become more constrained.
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) show that when classifying firms by dividends, credit
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ratings and the SA- or WW-Indexes, constrained firms are younger and smaller compared
to unconstrained firms, carry more cash on their balance sheet, have higher book-to-market
values and are more likely to be unprofitable. Lamont et al. (2001) and Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) also find that constrained firms are typically young, small and unprofitable
firms with high book-to-market values. These observations closely match the theoretical
predictions of Livdan et al. (2009).
Using the size classification scheme we find that constrained firms are slightly less levered
than unconstrained firms and rely more on short-term debt. Ferra-Mensa and Ljungqvist
also find that constrained firms are less leveraged, rely more on short-term debt, and
more often have no long-term debt at all. The negative relationship between leverage
and financial constraints has been found by several others, see section 2.4. On the other
hand, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Lamont et al. (2001), both find that leverage and
financial constraints are positively correlated. Additionally, Livdan et al. (2009) make
the theoretical prediction that financially constrained firms are likely to be highly levered.
Thus, it is unclear whether the size classification scheme matches the findings in the
literature regarding the relationship between leverage and financial constraints. We note
that the SA-Index also finds that constrained firms are less levered than unconstrained
firms, while for the Composite I and II Indexes, constrained firms are less levered by
construction.
In sum, the descriptive statistics show that constrained firms classified by size best match
the theoretical and empirical descriptions of financially constrained firms. The Composite
I Index is similar to the size in the firms it classifies as constrained, however, we note that
constrained and unconstrained firms have approximately the same book-to-market values
using this measure. Firms classified as constrained by the SA-Index do not seem to have
characteristics typically associated with constraints. The Composite II Index finds that
constrained firms are young and small, but that they are both more profitable and invest
more than unconstrained firms. Thus, constrained firms classified by the Composite II
Index share some of the characteristics typically associated with constrained firms, while
contradicting others.
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4.3.3 Do the classification schemes capture variations in the
elasticity of the supply curve of external capital?
We divide this investigation into two parts. First, we investigate the classification criteria’s
ability to identify variations in firms’ access to equity markets. Second, we investigate the
classification criteria’s ability to identify variations in firms’ access to- and cost of debt.
We note that these tests are only indicatory, and it is unlikely that an entire portfolio of
firms classified as constrained, are truly financially constrained.
Equity Markets
To test if the measures capture firms changing access to equity markets, we create a
dataset of the 175 firms which both enter and exit the sample from June 1996 to December
2018. Firms which both enter and exit are firms which delist from the OSE. We have
excluded firms with negative book-equity and penny stocks, such that the delisting’s
should not be related to bankruptcies, but rather signal that the firms are unable to access
public equity markets for capital.
Table 4.4 provides an overview of the characteristics of these firms the year they enter
and the year they exit the sample. We see that firms entering the sample have on average
negative earnings growth and a lower than average investment growth. Furthermore,
these firms are typically smaller than average. The year a firm exits the sample, its
average earnings growth and investment growth have fallen considerably along with its
market capitalization. In the literature, these are characteristics associated with increasing
financial constraints.
Table 4.4: This table provides an overview of the characteristics of firms which both enter and exit the
sample over the period July 1996 to December 2018. Market capitalization and total assets are denoted
in MNOK.
Year Entering Sample Year Exiting Sample
Mean Stdv Median Min Max Mean Stdv Median Min Max
Earnings growth -0.10 4.76 0.07 -43.78 14.61 -0.43 7.16 -0.03 -55.72 25.03
Investment growth 0.16 0.27 0.15 -0.37 0.46 0.05 0.24 0.01 -0.37 0.46
Market capitalization 2,382 9,066 728 17 113,692 1,954 3,210 742 32 21,080
Total assets 3,170 8,091 776 26 83,315 3,219 6,670 877 25 44,056
Debt-to-Assets 0.52 0.19 0.55 0.05 0.93 0.58 0.19 0.61 0.04 1.02
Book-to-Market 0.92 0.87 0.75 0.03 5.76 1.04 1.16 0.71 0.00 7.40
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Table 4.5 reports the number of firms classified as financially constrained and unconstrained
in the year they enter and exit the sample. If the classification schemes capture changes
in access to public equity markets, than each measure should see an increase the number
of firms it classifies as constrained, relative to itself, when moving from the year of entry
to the year of exit. Similarly, the number of unconstrained firms should decrease.
Table 4.5: This table reports the number of firms classified as financially constrained and unconstrained
in the year they enter and exit the sample for each of the classification scheme.
Size SA-Index Composite I Composite II
(C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
Year Entering Sample 71 25 101 14 53 23 50 47
Year Exiting Sample 92 14 62 30 74 15 57 36
We see that size and the Composite I respond correctly to the data, classifying more
firms as constrained and less as unconstrained in the year of exit. The SA-Index moves
the opposite way, decreasing the number of firms classified as constrained, while the
Composite II Index moves slightly in the correct direction. This indicates that size and
the Composite I Index best capture changes in firms access to equity markets over time,
while it casts doubt on the ability of the SA-Index to correctly classify firms. A weakness
of this simple test is that we are unable to separate whether changes in access to capital
markets reflects frictions in financial markets or firm-specific problems.
Credit Markets
The Composite I and II Indexes both use debt-to-assets as a ranking metric, hence we
cannot measure the effect of changes in access to credit markets independently for these
classification schemes. We are left with the size and SA-Index, which we now explore in
greater detail.
SA-Index
We start our investigation by constructing five decile portfolios using the SA-Index and 20%
breakpoints. The portfolios range from the least to most constrained and the associated
characteristics of each portfolio are reported in Table 4.6.
We see that the more constrained firms are both larger and younger than less constrained
firms, and that they on average invest more. Specifically, we see that the most constrained
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Table 4.6: In this table we use the SA-index to split the sample into five groups ranging from least to
most constrained using 20% quantile breakpoints, and report the associated characteristics of each decile
portfolio. Market capitalization and total assets are denoted in MNOK.
SA-Index Book-to-Market Profitability Investment Market capitalization Total assets
Least constrained 0.93 0.20 0.11 9,825 9,578
2 0.97 0.18 0.27 10,574 9,785
3 1.12 0.12 0.25 7,698 9,474
4 0.90 0.16 0.60 25,359 12,328
Most constrained 0.61 -0.03 0.27 39,601 28,133
SA-Index Debt-to-Assets Cash-to-Assets Coverage ratio Age N
Least constrained 0.56 0.10 12.27 18 380
2 0.60 0.11 13.58 12 366
3 0.59 0.13 8.47 7 366
4 0.55 0.17 11.40 5 366
Most constrained 0.44 0.24 0.87 4 376
have been able to finance almost half the asset growth through debt. Firms which are
young and large with high investment rates must have good access to capital markets,
which in turn means they are not financially constrained, making classification by the
SA-Index contradictory. We note this same contradiction above, when the SA-Index
decreases, the number of firms classified as constrained although less firms have access
to equity markets. Using their SA-Index, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that size and
age move together. Specifically, they find that financial constraints fall sharply as young
and small firms start to mature and grow, and that eventually these relations level off.
The SA-Index applied to our dataset shows age and size moving in opposite directions.
Taken together, these considerations heighten our suspicions that the SA-Index is unable
to correctly identify financially constrained firms when applied to Norwegian data.
Size
If size adequately captures financial constraints, we should find that constrained firms
experience large increases in the cost of debt as they increase their debt-to-asset ratio
relative to unconstrained firms. Campello and Chen (2010) find that the intensity of
financial constraints likely varies with time and that they are more likely to bind in bad
times. Thus, the slope of the supply curve of external capital should vary with time,
being steeper in downturns and flatter in periods of growth. Specifically, constrained firms
should experience larger increases in interest rates as they increase debt in bad times,
relative to good times. Table 4.7 reports the characteristics of five decile portfolios, from
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least to most constrained, constructed using firm size.
Table 4.7: In this table we use the firm size to split the sample into five groups ranging from least to
most constrained using 20% quantile breakpoints, and report the associated characteristics of each decile
portfolio. Market capitalization and total assets are denoted in MNOK.
Size Book-to-market Profitability Investment Market capitalization Total assets
Least constrained 0.60 0.26 0.22 88,880 57,271
2 0.78 0.19 0.53 4,967 7,506
3 0.97 0.13 0.35 1,567 2,959
4 1.06 0.22 0.29 617 1,503
Most constrained 1.12 -0.07 0.21 213 624
Size Debt-to-assets Cash-to-assets Coverage ratio Age N
Least constrained 0.55 0.10 19.42 12 376
2 0.56 0.13 12.92 10 366
3 0.56 0.18 9.28 8 362
4 0.51 0.18 7.18 8 370
Most constrained 0.54 0.17 -2.14 7 380
We see that financially constrained firms are on average only slightly less levered than
unconstrained firms. However, we make the following three observations. First, the cost of
debt increases monotonically with size. Second, the variability of the cost of debt increases
monotonically with size. Third, the variability of debt-to-assets increases monotonically
with size. These observations indicate that the most constrained firms typically have
debt of shorter maturities, and that the availability and cost of debt financing varies
considerably more over time than for the least constrained firms. A simple test of the
ability of size to capture differences in the supply curve of external capital between the
most and least constrained firms, is to graph the average cost of debt and the average
debt-to-asset ratios for the most and least and least constrained firms, as is done in Figure
4.2.
Figure 4.2 shows that the most constrained firms in general experience larger increases in
their cost of debt when increasing the debt-to-asset ratio relative the least constrained
firms. For example, from 2003 to 2004, the most constrained firms increased their debt-
to-asset ratio from 48% to 53%, while the average cost of debt increased from 6.7% to
9%. In percentage terms, this means that a 10% increase in debt-to-assets triggered
an approximately 35% increase in the cost of debt. Similarly, from 1996 to 1997, the
least constrained firms saw an increase in debt-to-assets from 50% to 55%, followed by
an increase in the cost of debt from 5% to 5.5%. This means that a 10% increase in
debt-to-assets was followed by a 10% increase in the cost of debt. Furthermore, the figure
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shows that movements in the cost of debt relative to movements in the debt-to-asset ratios
are more sensitive in bad times than good times. The results also indicate that the capital
supply curve shows more time-variation for constrained firms than unconstrained firms.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the average cost of debt and the debt-to-asset ratio for the most
and least constrained firms in our sample from July 1996 to December 2018. The debt-to-asset
ratios are illustrated via the line graphs (LHS), while the cost of debt is illustrated via the bars
(RHS). The cost of debt is defined as interest expenses over total liabilities.
These findings suggest that during economic and credit expansions, constrained firms
increase their borrowing relatively more than unconstrained firms. According to Gertler
and Bernanke (1989), these are periods in which the value of collateral increases, while
agency costs and the external finance premium declines. Then during cyclical downturns,
periods in which the value of collateral typically declines, and agency costs rise, they find
it more difficult to borrow. Thus, as they repay their debt, and are unable to refinance
to their previous debt levels, their debt-to-asset ratios decline. Taken together, it seems
that the size classification scheme is able to identify both differences in the slope of the
supply curve of external capital between constrained and unconstrained firms, and how
this curve changes over time.
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5 Results
5.1 Financial Constraints and Real Business Risk
In this section we look at whether financially constrained firms are fundamentally riskier
than unconstrained firms. If financial constraints work a long the lines of Gertler and
Bernanke (1989), then constraints have real business affects and serve to amplify and
propagate economic shocks. We investigate this by regressing the yearly median real
operating earnings- and investment growth of portfolios of constrained and unconstrained
firms on various proxies of macroeconomic and credit market conditions. These proxies
include the growth rates20 of industrial production, the unemployment rate, the real
oil price, the credit-to-GDP ratio and the two-year swap spread. The right-hand side
variables are normalized so that they have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one.
Furthermore, we sign all macro variables such that a positive change signals a deterioration
in macroeconomic activity or credit market conditions.
Specifically, for each portfolio of constrained or unconstrained firms we regress the median
real operating earnings- and investment growth γt, on the macroeconomic and credit
market proxies, denoted MACROt. The change in the Norwegian policy rate, the trade-
weighted NOK currency index and the ten-over-two-year US yield spread are included as
control variables, denoted CONTROLt. The regression equation is given by
γt = α + ϕMACROt + ηCONTROLt + ut (5.1)
Our main interest is in the size and sign of ϕ, in addition to the associated p-values, which
are computed via Newey and West (1987) coefficients. In order to investigate whether
financially constrained firms are riskier than unconstrained firms we must test whether
the estimates of ϕ are significantly different for the two groups. We do this by subtracting
the unconstrained from the constrained estimates of ϕ, resulting in a set of difference
coefficients. Furthermore, following Campello and Chen (2010), we estimate the standard
20For industrial production, the unemployment rate, the oil price and the two-year swap spread we
first calculate the monthly growth rates, then average these over the full year. For the credit-to-GDP
ratio we calculate quarterly growth rates and average these over the full year, as this variable is published
on a quarterly basis.
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errors of these difference coefficients using a SUR-system.21
The fundamental regression results, estimated by Eq.5.1 are provided in Table 5.2. The
table consists of two panels; Panel A reports the regression results when the median real
operating earnings growth is used as the dependent variable, while Panel B reports the
results when the median real investment growth is used as the dependent variable. We
find two key results in this section.
First, the operating earnings- and investment growth of constrained firms decline more
in response to adverse macroeconomic and credit market conditions than those of
unconstrained firms, as demonstrated by the negative difference coefficients. During
expansions this result is reversed. This means that financially constrained firms are
fundamentally riskier than unconstrained firms. Furthermore, the results show that
financing imperfections in Norway leads to heterogeneous firm responses to macroeconomic
shocks, a result supported by several theoretical findings (see for example Gertler and
Bernanke (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), and Livdan et al.
(2009)).
Second, we find that financial constraints are time-varying and bind more in downturns
than expansions, as indicated by the negative difference coefficients. This means financially
constrained firms behave in a significantly more procyclical fashion than unconstrained
firms. These results are in line with Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Kashyap et al. (1994)
and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), who all show that credit constraints are time-varying
and seem to bind more during recessions or when monetary policy is tight.
5.1.1 Earnings Growth
For constrained firms, the coefficients on industrial production, unemployment and credit-
to-GDP are negative for all classification criteria. This means that a fall in industrial
production and credit-to-GDP, or a rise in unemployment leads to a reduction in the real
operating earnings of constrained firms. The oil price coefficient is negative and significant
for three out of four regressions, a result we discuss in detail below. For the size group,
an oil price coefficient of -0.16 means that for a one standard deviation fall in the average
21For details, see appendix section A3.
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growth rate of the oil price, the real earnings growth of constrained firms falls by sixteen
percent. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the swap spread is positive and significant in three
out of four cases.
For unconstrained firms, the sign on the industrial production-, unemployment-, credit-
to-GDP-, and swap spread coefficients are negative. This means that the real earnings
growth of unconstrained firms falls unequivocally in response to adverse macroeconomic
and credit-market conditions. We note that the coefficients are generally smaller and less
significant than for constrained firms. The oil price coefficient is positive in three of the
regressions, however the coefficients are not significant and close to zero for all cases.
The difference coefficients indicate that constrained firms are more procyclical than
unconstrained firms. In Table 5.2 for example, the coefficient for industrial production
equals -0.08 for financially constrained firms and -0.04 for unconstrained firms. This
means the operating earnings of constrained firms are two times more procyclical than
the operating earnings of unconstrained firms. The direct interpretation is that for a
one standard deviation decline in industrial production, the decline in the real operating
earnings growth of financially constrained firms is 8% per year, while for unconstrained
firms it is 4%. The difference coefficients are negative for all variables except the swap
spread and thirteen of the twenty difference coefficients are significant.
The swap spread coefficients in Table 5.2 indicate that the operating earnings of financially
constrained firms increase when credit conditions worsen, a result we do not find
economically reasonable. Furthermore, this contradicts our findings for the credit-to-GDP
variable. We re-run the regression in Table 5.2, omitting 2008 and 2009 from the dataset
to check whether the positive coefficients are driven by abnormal movements during
the financial crises. The coefficients on the swap spread, as estimated by each of the
classification criteria, are reported in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Earnings growth coefficient on the two-year swap spread, ex. 08-09
This table reports the earnings growth coefficients on the two-year swap spread as estimated by the
various classification schemes after re-running the fundamental regression equation γt = α+ϕMACROt+
ηCONTROLt +ut, and omitting all observations in 2008 and 2009 from the dataset. The original results
are reported in Table 5.2, while the full regression tables excluding 2008 and 2009 are reported in the
appendix section A6.
Size SA-Index Composite I Composite II
(C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
Swap Spread -0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.04** 0.00 -0.05** -0.01 -0.05**
p-value (0.11) (0.00) (0.57) (0.03) (0.23) (0.03) (0.14) (0.02)
We see that the swap spread coefficient for constrained firms now varies between 0.00 and
-0.02, depending on the classification scheme. Furthermore, the coefficients on the other
macro and credit variables do not change meaningfully, leaving our previous conclusions
intact, see appendix A6. This indicates that the positive swap spread coefficients were
primarily driven by a period of positive correlation between earnings and the swap spread
for at least some financially constrained firms from 2008-2009.
5.1.2 Investment Growth
The investment responses to changes in the macroeconomic and credit market conditions
are in general smaller and less significant than for operating earnings. The coefficients on
industrial production, unemployment and credit-to-GDP are either negative or zero for
both constrained and unconstrained firms. However, the coefficients for constrained firms
are in general smaller than those of unconstrained firms, resulting in negative difference
coefficients. Only three of the sixteen difference coefficients are positive, however these
are not significant. We also note that only four difference coefficients are significant but
these are all negative. Thus, although the results for investment growth are statistically
weaker, they still point to financially constrained firms being fundamentally riskier than
unconstrained firms.
48 5.1 Financial Constraints and Real Business Risk
Table 5.2: Responses of Business Fundamentals to Macroeconomic Shocks
This table provides the results from regressing the median real operating earnings- and investment
growth of portfolios of constrained and unconstrained firms on various macroeconomic and credit market
variables. The results are provided in Panel A and B respectively. Specifically, the regression equation is
given by γt = α+ ϕMACROt + ηCONTROLt + ut. The macroeconomic and credit market variables
include the growth rates of industrial production (Ind Prod), the unemployment rate (Unempl), the
oil price, the credit-to-GDP ratio (Credit/GDP) and the two-year swap spread (Swap Spread). The
control variables include the change in the Norwegian policy rate, the trade-weighted NOK currency
index and the ten-over-two year US yield spread. See section 3.1 and 3.2 for a further elaboration on
the macroeconomic variables, and section 4.1.1 and 4.2 for the construction of the various classification
schemes. The right-hand side variables are normalized so they have zero mean and standard deviation
equal to one. The independent variables are signed such that a positive value represents a worsening of
macroeconomic conditions or tightening of credit markets. Difference coefficients across regressions are
estimated via a SUR-system. The p-values of the original coefficients are reported in the parenthesis and
are computed via Newey and West (1987) coefficients. The 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level is given by
*, ** and *** respectively.
Panel A: Earnings Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraints Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit/GDP Swap Spread
Size
Constrained (C) -0.08** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.12** 0.11**
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02)
Unconstrained (U) -0.04 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.03 -0.16***
(0.16) (0.00) (0.49) (0.34) (0.00)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.04 -0.10** -0.18*** -0.09* 0.27***
(0.44) (0.05) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.04 -0.14*** -0.05 -0.11*** 0.06
(0.12) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.18)
Unconstrained (U) -0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.05*** -0.01
(0.51) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.43)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.02 -0.07* -0.05 -0.06 0.07**
(0.16) (0.07) (0.26) (0.15) (0.04)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.12*** -0.22** -0.19*** -0.30*** 0.15*
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07)
Unconstrained (U) -0.02 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.11 -0.03***
(0.48) (0.00) (0.69) (0.9) (0.00)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.10 -0.18** -0.20*** -0.19*** 0.18***
(0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.24 -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.25*** 0.17***
(0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Unconstrained (U) -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03
(0.74) (0.16) (0.22) (0.98) (0.24)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.23 -0.09*** -0.11 -0.25*** 0.20***
(0.15) (0.01) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00)
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Panel B: Investment Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraints Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit/GDP Swap Spread
Size
Constrained (C) 0.00 -0.07*** -0.03** -0.04* -0.01
(0.88) (0.00) (0.04) (0.09) (0.65)
Unconstrained (U) -0.01* -0.04*** 0.00 -0.02 0.00
(0.08) (0.00) (0.76) (0.18) (0.64)
Difference (C) - (U) 0.01 -0.03** -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.71) (0.03) (0.20) (0.32) (0.73)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02 -0.05*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.29) (0.00) (0.77)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.03*** -0.02 -0.02*** 0.00
(0.51) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.43)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.03*** 0.00 0.00 -0.03** 0.00
(0.00) (0.71) (0.90) (0.05) (0.55)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.04** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.06*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.57)
Unconstrained (U) -0.01 -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.34) (0.00) (0.75) (0.39) (0.67)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04* 0.00
(0.20) (0.88) (0.19) (0.08) (0.75)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.02 -0.03* -0.02 -0.06* 0.01
(0.54) (0.09) (0.20) (0.07) (0.14)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.05*** -0.01* -0.03 0.00
(0.83) (0.00) (0.09) (0.45) (0.69)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01
(0.33) (0.34) (0.69) (0.31) (0.89)
5.1.3 The Oil Price
In Panel A we see that the oil price coefficients for earnings growth are negative and
statistically significant for constrained firms, while for unconstrained firms they are not
significantly different from zero. In Panel B, the oil price coefficient on investment growth
is either negative or zero and slightly larger for constrained firms, resulting in negative
but insignificant difference coefficients. These results can be explained in two parts.
First, the companies which are classified as both oil companies and financially constrained
are almost entirely oil service companies, rather than oil exploration and production
companies. Examples include offshore suppliers, seismic companies and companies
providing various engineering solutions. These companies derive their earnings from the
oil companies’ capital expenditures. Oil companies will change their capital expenditures
in response to changes in the oil price. A sharp reduction in the oil price usually leads
to reductions in capital spending, and the percentage drop in capital spending is often
larger than the percentage drop in the oil price. Small oil service companies typically
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have shorter contract durations, but large fixed costs. When oil companies reduce capital
spending there are fewer contracts to compete for, making contract bids more competitive.
In addition, fewer firms receive contracts at all. Since the firms must cover their fixed
costs, operating earnings typically drop considerably in periods with low oil prices.
Unconstrained firms also classified as oil companies include a mix of oil exploration and
production companies and large oil service companies. An oil exploration and production
company will typically experience a loss in operating profits in proportion to the fall in oil
price, usually avoiding an acute drop in operating earnings. Larger oil service companies
will typically have both longer contracts and more pricing power to compete for the
available contracts. The effect of lower capital spending therefore takes a longer time
to reduce earnings for large oil service companies. Thus, these firms do not impact the
unconstrained sample in the extreme way in which constrained oil companies affect their
sample.
Second, non-oil companies classified as constrained are more sensitive to the oil price than
non-oil companies classified as unconstrained. We re-run the regressions in Table 5.2,
omitting oil companies from the sample. The oil price coefficients are reported in Table
5.3 for both earnings- and investment growth, while the full regression table is reported in
the appendix section A5.
Table 5.3: Earnings- and investment growth excluding oil companies
This table reports the earnings- and investment growth coefficients for the oil price as estimated by the
various classification schemes after re-running the fundamental regression equation γt = α+ϕMACROt+
ηCONTROLt + ut, and excluding oil companies from the dataset. The original regression results are
reported in Table 5.2, while the full regression tables with oil companies omitted are reported in the
appendix section A5.
Size SA-Index Composite I Composite II
Earnings Growth (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
Oil Price -0.07*** 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.08*** 0.05*** -0.06 0.00
p-value (0.00) (0.90) (0.13) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.68)
Size SA-Index Composite I Composite II
Investment Growth (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
Oil Price -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.03
p-value (0.00) (0.84) (0.11) (0.23) (0.16) (0.10) (0.79) (0.51)
For constrained firms, the coefficient on the oil price increases, however it is still negative
and significant. The oil price coefficient for unconstrained firms also increases slightly,
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however remains positive and insignificant. As discussed in section 3.1, a positive oil price
shock tends to increase GDP over the following year, i.e. a positive aggregate demand
effect. The higher oil price sensitivity of financially constrained non-oil companies likely
captures that these firms are more sensitive to changes in aggregate demand. This is the
same conclusion we draw from the industrial production and unemployment variables.
5.1.4 A Comparison of Financial Constraints in Norway and the
US
We compare our difference coefficients from Table 5.2 with those of the US, as reported by
Campello and Chen (2010), to investigate whether differences in economic environments
and time periods materially impact the real effects of financial constraints. In Table 5.4
we report the average difference coefficients across all classification criteria for Norway and
the US. Note that our classification criteria are partly different from those of Campello
and Chen.22 Additionally, the credit variables we use are not directly comparable to those
of Campello and Chen, hence we focus on industrial production and unemployment.
Our main conclusion from this section is that the economic environment, nor time period
seem to have material impacts on the real effects of financial constraints. We see this by
noting that as measured by operating earnings, constrained firms in Norway are more
procyclical then their US counterparts. However, as measured by investments, constrained
firms in the US are more procyclical than constrained firms in Norway.
Table 5.4: This table reports the average difference coefficients on industrial production and
unemployment/employment for Norway and the US. The average difference coefficients for Norway
are calculated from 5.2. The US results are calculated by averaging Campello and Chen (2010)’s difference
coefficient estimates. Campello and Chen (2010) use firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX
from January 1963 to December 2006, while we use firms listed on the OSE from July 1996 to December
2018.
Norway US
Earnings Investment Earnings Investment
Industrial Production -0.098 -0.018 -0.055 -0.030
Unemployment/ Employment -0.110 -0.003 -0.035 -0.023
22The financial constraint criteria used in their analysis are the KZ-Index, size, the Composite I
Measure (the KZ-Index, size, coverage ratio, and dividend payout ratio) and the Composite II Measure
(coverage ratio, dividend payout ratio, commercial paper rating, and bondrating). Both composite
measures are computed with the same algorithm as this study. See section 2.4 for definition of the
KZ-Index.
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The coefficients in Table 5.4 are interpreted equivalently to the coefficients in Table 5.2.
For example, the earnings growth of constrained firms in Norway fall on average by 9.8%
more than the earnings growth unconstrained firms in response to a one standard deviation
fall in industrial production. The corresponding number for the US is 5.5%. We note that
in Norway the difference coefficients are most sensitive to unemployment, while in the US
they are most sensitive to industrial production. The higher sensitivity to employment in
Norway may be due to differences in the employment measures used,23 the difference in
sample periods, or differences in classification schemes. Importantly, our sample includes
the financial crisis, while Campello and Chen’s sample does not.
We note that the higher sensitivity of investment growth in the US may be due to differences
in the way firms obtain debt financing. In Europe, bank lending is the most important
source of debt funding, while in the US, bond markets are dominant.24 This would in
turn mean that when macroeconomic conditions worsen, financing new investments with
debt is more expensive in the US than in Europe, causing higher investment sensitivities
to changing economic conditions in the US. A further investigation into the viability of
this explanation is beyond the scope of this thesis and we leave it to future research.
The relatively smaller magnitude of the difference coefficients on industrial production in
Norway may also reflect that we include the oil price in our analysis, while Campello and
Chen (2010) does not.
5.1.5 Conclusions from Financial Constraints and Real Firm
Performance
In sum our results show that financially constrained firms are fundamentally riskier than
unconstrained firms in the sense that they exhibit stronger covariation with systematic
factors than unconstrained firms. Furthermore, our results indicate that financial
constraints are time-varying and that they bind the most in downturns. These findings
are consistent with theories which emphasize the role of financial frictions in amplifying
and propagating economic shocks. Our results are also in line with what Campello and
Chen (2010) find for their US sample. Specific to Norway, we find a negative relationship
between financial constraints and the oil price, such that when the oil price is low, financial
23We use monthly NAV-numbers, while Campello and Chen (2010) use non-farm payrolls.
24See Farrell et al. (2005) and Brecht (2015).
5.2 The Financial Constraint Factor 53
constraints seem to bind more and when the oil price is high, financial constraints bind
less. We show that one part of this result stems from the market structure of the oil
sector, which leads to heterogeneous responses in the financial positions of firms following
an oil price shock. Our results indicate that the other part of this negative relationship is
a consequence of constrained firms being more sensitive to economic fluctuations than
unconstrained firms.
5.2 The Financial Constraint Factor
The real-side results show that financially constrained firms are fundamentally riskier than
unconstrained firms, which according to standard asset pricing theory, should be reflected
in asset valuations in the form of a financial constraint factor. Specifically, we expect
constrained firms to earn a positive risk premium over unconstrained firms reflecting the
fact that investors require higher returns to hold the stocks of riskier firms. In this section
we investigate whether we can identify such a financial constraint factor in Norwegian
securities markets.
To construct the financial constraint factor we calculate both value-weighted and equal-
weighted monthly stock returns for portfolios of constrained (C), middle (M), and
unconstrained (U) firms for each of the classification schemes. We then subtract the
returns of the constrained portfolio from the unconstrained portfolio and average this
difference over the sample period. These are the one-way sorted results, which are reported
on the left-hand side of Table 5.5 for each of the classification schemes separately.
We follow the asset pricing literature and report double-sorted financial constraint
premiums using book-to-market portfolios. Specifically, we sort firms into three book-to-
market categories, high (H), middle (M) and low (L), using 30% and 70% cutoffs and then
interact the financial constraint categories (C, M, U) with the book-to-market categories
(H, M, L), creating nine portfolios. We then calculate the book-to-market neutralized
constraint factor as ((CH + CM + CL) – (UH + UM + UL))/3, where for example, CL
represents the monthly equity return of a portfolio of constrained firms with low book-
to-market values. Note that the book-to-market portfolios do not change; however, the
constrained and unconstrained portfolios change depending on the classification scheme.
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These results are the book-to-market neutralized results, which reported one the right-hand
side of Table 5.5 for each of the classification schemes separately.
The first key result from Table 5.5 is that the real risk associated with financial constraints
are priced in the stock market in the form of a financial constraint factor. For example, for
portfolios created by the Composite I Index, we find that the yearly growth in operating
earnings of constrained firms fall on average by 10% more than those of unconstrained
firms in response to negative macroeconomic shocks. On the financial side, the stocks
of the same portfolio of constrained firms will earn on average 1.3% more than the
unconstrained portfolio per month, which amounts to a 15.6% risk-premium per year. We
note that all the financial constraint premiums are positive when they are book-to-market
neutralized, and six of the eight premiums are significant. In total, only two of the sixteen
risk premiums are negative.
As a specific example of the real-financial connection we use portfolios constructed with
the Composite I Index and look at how the operating earnings- and investment growth of
constrained and unconstrained firms change from 2007 to 2008, and how these changes
were reflected in financial markets. The results are reported in Table 5.6. We see that
both operating earnings and investment fall more for constrained than unconstrained firms
in response to adverse macroeconomic and credit market conditions. This is reflected in
financial markets as the stock returns of constrained firms fall by 8%, while the returns
of unconstrained firms only fall by 5%, which indicates that the size of the financial
constraint factor declines in downturns but remains positive.25
Table 5.6: This table illustrates the real-financial connection by looking at the change in the operating
earnings- and investment growth rates for constrained and unconstrained firms, relative to the change
in stock returns from 2007 to 2008. The growth rates and financial returns are based on portfolios
constructed with the Composite I Index.
2007 2008 Difference
(C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
Operating Earnings 0.15 0.34 0.00 0.22 -0.15 -0.12
Investment 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.15 -0.09 -0.03
Average Monthly Stock Returns 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05
25Specifically, in 2007 the monthly size of the financial constraint factor was on average 3% (0.03-0.00),
while in 2008 it was on average 1% (-0.05-(-0.06)), as estimated by the Composite I Index.
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The second key result is that the size effect represents a large component of the financial
constraint premium. In financial literature, the size effect refers to the observation that
smaller firms earn on average higher returns than larger firms after controlling for market
risk, as first observed by Banz (1981). The literature generally views the size effect as a
proxy for risk, however no consensus has emerged on the underlying source of risk. Several
researchers suggest that size is a proxy for a firm’s degree of financial constraints, see for
example Livdan et al. (2009) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). Liu (2006) argues that the
premium reflects the lower stock market liquidity of smaller stocks and suggests investors
require higher returns for accepting the liquidity risk. Zhang (2006) suggests that size
may also reflect information uncertainty, as smaller firms typically provide poorer overall
information to investors.
We illustrate the size effect on our results by changing the ranking variables in the one-way
sorted Composite I Index. First, we omit the size variable from the ranking procedure. The
risk premium falls to 0.011, remaining significant at the 0.05-level. The Composite I Index
still contains a total assets component, which is strongly linked to firm size. Removing
total assets leaves us with age, leverage-to-assets, cash-to-assets and the coverage ratio as
the ranking variables. The risk-premium falls to 0.009 with a p-value of 0.07. Dropping
the age variable leaves us at Composite II. The declining risk-premiums suggest that the
size effect drives much of the results. However, the book-to-market neutralized Composite
II Index does have a positive and significant risk-premium, indicating that size is not the
only effect driving the results.
Since the Composite I- and the SA-Index both contain a size component, while the
Composite II Index does not, the results more strongly lean towards financial constraints
being priced if one accepts size as a good measure of financial constraints. However, if one
views firm-specific characteristics such as cash, leverage, and interest coverage as the key
factors, while size being a proxy for other risk factors, then the results do not necessarily
indicate a financial constraint risk premium.
The double sorting procedure, using book-to-market, is done to isolate financial constraint
factor from confounding effects. To see this, note that high book-to-market firms earn a
positive risk premium over low book-to-market firms in our sample, see Table 5.8. The
observation that high book-to-market firms earn higher returns than low book-to-market
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firms after controlling for market risk and size, is known as the value effect (Fama and
French (2015, 1993, 1992); Chen and Zhang (1998)). The literature has proposed two main
explanations for the value effect, although several others exist. First, Fama and French
(1992) suggest that the value effect exists because book-to-market reflects a firm’s degree
of financial distress risk. They show that firms with high book-to-market values typically
have earnings problems and relatively high levels of financial leverage. This explanation
contends that the premium attached to value firms (high BE/ME) are the rational result
of the higher financial distress risk inherent in these firms. The second explanation
suggests that the effect is due to irrational pricing as investors become overly optimistic
or pessimistic about the prospects of firms exhibiting certain “growth-or value-related”
characteristics (Lakonishok et al. (1994); Daniel and Titman (1997)). Dichev (1998) and
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find evidence suggesting that the mispricing associated with
BE/ME exists even after controlling for bankruptcy risk.
For the one-way sorted sample, a part of the risk-premium found in Table 5.5 is not
attributable to financial constraints, but rather to the value effect, likely reflecting either
financial distress, investor irrationality or both. Double sorting removes this extra effect.
We therefore view the book-to-market neutralized financial constraint premiums as the
most important in Table 5.5. For example, we find that small firms have high book-
to-market values while large firms have lower book-to-market values. The difference in
returns between small and large firms can therefore in part be attributed to the value
effect. Double sorting adjusts for this effect such that the constraint factor for size should
fall, which we see is the case. On the other hand, unconstrained firms classified by the
SA-Index have higher book-to-market values than constrained firms, see Table 4.3. Double
sorting should should then increase the financial constraint premium because the value
effect favors unconstrained firms, which we see is the case.
Livdan et al. (2009)’s theoretical model predicts that constrained firms have higher leverage
and lower liquidity than unconstrained firms. As discussed in section 4.3.2 this does not
seem to be the case in our sample. Nonetheless, we test the prediction by reversing our
leverage and cash variable rankings and re-calculate the financial constraint premium for
the Composite II Index. This means firms with lower leverage and higher cash holdings
are ranked as less financially constrained. In this case the risk premium is negative and
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not significant.
The SA-Index aims to capture the non-linear relationship between size, age and financial
constraints. For the SA-Index, the fundamental regression gives some indication that
constrained firms are more risky than unconstrained firms, leading us to expect a
positive risk premium. On the other hand, the descriptive statistics of constrained
and unconstrained firms classified by the SA-Index lead us to expect a negative financial
constraint premium, see Table 4.3, which is the case for the market weighted financial
constraint premium. However, neutralizing with book-to-market results in a marginally
positive and significant risk premium. The equal-weighted financial constraint factor is
also positive and becomes strongly significant when neutralizing with book-to-market. It
seems that the SA-Index captures some non-linearities in the data which are not reflected
in the descriptive statistics. We view these results as mixed and difficult to interpret.
5.3 Macroeconomic Shocks and the Financial
Constraint Factor
In this section we examine whether the financial constraint factor is correlated with
macroeconomic and credit market conditions. We do this by regressing the various
estimates of the financial constraint factor on proxies of the macroeconomic and credit
market conditions. There are two reasons why these regressions are interesting. First, the
regressions check for consistency. Ex-ante, we expect the coefficients to have the same
sign as in the fundamental regression. For example, an increase in the unemployment
rate decreases the operating earnings of financially constrained firms more than those of
unconstrained firms. This means that the stock prices of financially constrained firms
should fall more than the stock prices of unconstrained firms, which would in turn decrease
the size of the financial constraint factor. Second, the first moment of the return generating
process, i.e. the financial constraint factor, is much more sample-dependent and therefore
harder to measure precisely than higher moments of the return generating process, see
Merton (1980). Thus, regression-based tests that revolve around higher moments such as
covariances will serve as a quality check to the risk-premiums found earlier.
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Specifically, we use the same macroeconomic-, credit market- and control variables26
as in the real-side regression estimated by Eq.5.1, and sign all explanatory variables
such that a positive change signals a deterioration in macroeconomic activity or credit
market conditions. The equity return data now allows us to work with monthly frequency.
Following Campello and Chen (2010), we include two lags and report the summed
coefficients per quarter. The following model of factor returns is estimated
FCt = α +
2∑
i=0
βi ×4MACROt−i + λCONTROLt + εt (5.2)
where FCt is the financial constraint factor as estimated by one of the classification
schemes, 4MACROt denotes the change27 in the macroeconomic and credit market
variables, and CONTROLt denotes the control variables. We estimate Eq.5.2 for each of
the four classification schemes and report the sum of the macro-variable lag coefficients and
associated p-values28 in Table 5.7. The results for the one-way sorted financial constraint
factors are reported on the left-hand side, while the size-neutralized29 results are reported
on the right-hand side. The financial constraint factor used in Panel A is constructed
using value-weighted stock returns, while the constraint factor in Panel B is constructed
using equal-weighted stock returns. We find three key results in this section.
First, the results provided in Panel A indicate that size is the most consistent variable in
capturing financial constraints in the data. For the size-based constraint factor, all variables
are significant, and all variables have the same sign as in the fundamental regression,
which means that the real- and financial results are consistent. The interpretation of
the coefficients is straight forward; a one percent fall in the growth rate of industrial
production leads to a reduction in the financial constraint factor of 0.62 percent over
the following quarter. When double-sorting, the financial constraint factor should be
26The macroeconomic and credit market variables include industrial production, the unemployment
rate, the oil price, the credit-to-GDP ratio and the two-year NOK swap spread. The control variables
includes the change in the Norwegian policy rate, the ten-over-two year US yield spread, and the NOK
trade-weighted currency index.
27For industrial production, the unemployment rate, the oil price and the two-year swap spread we
use monthly growth rates, while for the credit-to-GDP ratio we use quarterly growth rates since it is only
published at a quarterly frequency.
28The p-values are calculated using a Chi-square test with the null hypothesis that the sum of the
contemporaneous and two lagged coefficients are equal to zero.
29The size-neutralized financial constraint factors are calculated in the same way as the book-to-market
neutralized constrained factors, replacing the book-to-market portfolios with size portfolios, see section
5.2 for details.
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redundant since its effect is absorbed by the endogenous variable size. We see that there is
some reduction in the size and significance of the coefficients, but the double-sorting effect
is marginal as the results were not strong to begin with. The equal-weighted financial
constraint premiums reported in Panel B are the strongest for the Composite I and II
Indexes. In this case, neutralizing with size reduces almost all significance, as expected,
which supports the theoretical prediction that size and financial constraints are determined
endogenously and thus, that size is a good proxy for financial constraints.
Second, the results indicate that the stock returns of financially constrained firms
underperform those of unconstrained firms in downturns and periods of tight credit
conditions, i.e. when financial constraints bind the most, and outperform in expansions,
when constraints bind the least. To see this, note that the coefficients in Table 5.7 are
generally negative, which means that the size of the financial constraint factor declines
during downturns, reflecting the poorer earnings- and investment prospects of constrained
firms relative to unconstrained firms. We illustrate the covariation between the financial
constraint factor and macroeconomic conditions directly in figures 5.1 and 5.2, where we
plot the cumulative returns of portfolio’s of constrained and unconstrained firms over
time. We see that on average constrained firms earn a risk premium over unconstrained
firms, however, this premium declines during recessions and increases during expansions,
indicating that the financial constraint factor covaries with macroeconomic and credit
market conditions. In general, the evidence of a link between macroeconomic variables
and the financial constraint factor have been mixed. For example, Campello and Chen
(2010) find a clear connection, while Lamont et al. (2001) find only marginal evidence of
such a link.
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of the cumulative returns of constrained and unconstrained firms classified
by size from July 1996 to December 2018. The shaded areas are periods of recession in Norway, as
identified by Aastveit et al. (2016). The difference between the constrained and unconstrained cumulative
returns equals the cumulative returns of the financial constraint factor.
Figure 5.2: An illustration of the cumulative returns of constrained and unconstrained firms classified
by the Composite I Index from July 1996 to December 2018. The shaded areas are periods of
recession in Norway, as identified by Aastveit et al. (2016). The difference between the constrained and
unconstrained cumulative returns equals the cumulative returns of the financial constraint factor.
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Third, as pointed out by Campello and Chen (2010) the relationship between real business
fundamentals, the financial constraint factor and macroeconomic variables indicate a
macroeconomy-equity valuation channel that works along the lines of Gertler and Bernanke
(1989). For example, a negative macroeconomic shock will reduce the equity valuation of
all firms as future expected cash flows decline. However, for financially constrained firms,
the reduced net worth will increase agency costs, increasing the external finance premium,
decreasing investments, and thus, exacerbating the downturn. Specifically, there are likely
two accelerator effects tied to equity valuations.
First, assume a financially constrained firm experiences a notable decline in its share
price in response to a macroeconomic shock. The reduction in market value means the
implied value of the firms assets are lower, which means the implied value of collateral is
lower, which according to Gertler and Bernanke (1989) should raise agency costs and the
external finance premium, reducing investment and earnings growth. As this same chain
of reactions takes place collectively for all constrained firms, the downturn is exacerbated,
which leads to a further fall in stock prices, resulting in a financial accelerator effect.
Second, all else equal, a lower share price means that a lower fraction of projects can be
financed by issuing equity. This in turn means that either fewer projects are initiated,
or a larger fraction of projects must be financed with debt. However, as Hall (2001)
notes, the borrower’s stake in an investment project serves as a signal to lenders of the
borrower’s likely incentive to default. Borrowers with low stakes in a project will have to
pay higher costs of debt to offset the greater likelihood of default. This in turn means the
firm receives a lower part of the project payoff. Thus, whether the project is initiated or
not, future expected cash flows fall, which in turn should lower the stock price again.
These accelerator effects are likely an important part of the reason that the operating
earnings- and investment growth of constrained firms decline significantly more than
those of unconstrained firms in response to macroeconomic shocks. We note from Figure
4.2 that the debt-to-asset ratios of constrained firms decline much more than those of
unconstrained firms in downturns. The reductions in debt-to-assets are in general smaller
than the reductions in equity values, but an accelerator affects along the lines of Gertler
and Bernanke (1989) may be present on the debt side as well.
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5.4 Asset Pricing and the Financial Constraint Factor
In this section we investigate whether the risk-premiums we have found represent
an independent source of comovement in stock returns. We start by looking at the
characteristics and correlations between the financial constraint factors, the Fama-French
factors30 and the value-weighted market portfolio. Next, we regress the various estimates
of the financial constraint factor on the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor- and five-
factor models. If neither of these models can explain the return variations of the financial
constraint factor, then the financial constraint factor should be an explanatory variable in
asset pricing models. We will focus on the financial constraint factors constructed using
value-weighted stock returns31 as these showed greater statistical significance and are
therefore more interesting to investigate.
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the returns of the Fama-French factor mimicking portfolios, the
financial constraint factor estimates and the market portfolio are provided in Table 5.8.
We find that all Fama-French factors but the RMW factor have a positive average return
over the sample period. However, only the SMB32 and market portfolio have monthly
returns significantly greater than zero, at 1.5% and 0.80% respectively. The financial
constraint factor results are discussed separately in section 5.2.
Table 5.8: This table reports descriptive statistics of the market portfolio, the Fama-French factor
mimicking portfolios and the various estimates of the financial constraint factor. The book-to-market
neutralized financial constraint factors are denoted BM. All reported financial constraint and Fama-French
factors are constructed using one-way sorted portfolios and value-weighted stock returns. For details on
the construction of the financial constraint factors, see section 4.2 and 4.1.1. For the construction of the
Fama-French factors, see section 4.1.2 and A9.
SMB SA Comp I Comp II BM SA BM
Comp I
BM
Comp II
HML CMA RMW RM -
RF
Mean 0.015 -0.002 0.013 0.007 0.009 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.005 -0.007 0.008
T-Statistic 4,040 -0.660 2.720 1.560 2.230 3.980 1.850 0.780 1.160 -1.500 2.060
Stdv 0.061 0.057 0.076 0.076 0.058 0.075 0.067 0.061 0.063 0.076 0.058
Min -0.195 -0.194 -0.213 -0.306 -0.188 -0.178 -0.222 -0.292 -0.155 -0.265 -0.234
Max 0.248 0.252 0.317 0.244 0.319 0.489 0.257 0.177 0.161 0.245 0.170
Cumulative 3.915 -0.615 3.260 1.883 2.212 4.689 2.102 0.759 1.179 -1.823 1.928
30These include the SMB, HML, CMA, RMW factors, see A9 for details.
31Campello and Chen (2010) use equal-weighted stock returns.
32Note that the Fama-French SMB factor is also the size-estimated financial constraint factor.
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5.4.2 Correlations
5.4.2.1 Financial Constraint Factor Return Correlations
In Table 5.9 we report the correlations between the financial constraint factor returns.
Notably the SA-Index and the book-to-market neutralized SA-index are negatively
correlated with the returns of the other financial constraint factors. This is consistent
with what we find in section 4.3, where we show that firms classified as constrained by the
SA-Index typically share the characteristics of unconstrained firms classified by the other
classification schemes. All other correlations are positive; however, the degree of correlation
varies considerably. Furthermore, correlations are between 0.50 and 0.70 for the one-way
sorted classifications scheme and their book-to-market neutralized counterpart, which
shows the considerable effects of isolating the financial constraint factor from confounding
elements.
Table 5.9: This table reports the correlations between the financial constraint factor returns for each
of the classification schemes. The BM-neutralized financial constraint factors are denoted with BM. All
factors are created using value-weighted stock returns.
SMB SA Comp I Comp II BM Size BM SA BM
Comp I
BM
Comp II
SMB 1.00 -0.26 0.54 0.30 0.88 0.10 0.51 0.17
SA -0.26 1.00 -0.21 -0.31 -0.07 0.52 -0.08 -0.13
Comp I 0.54 -0.21 1.00 0.60 0.39 0.16 0.77 0.51
Comp II 0.30 -0.31 0.60 1.00 0.14 -0.06 0.37 0.77
BM Size 0.88 -0.07 0.39 0.14 1.00 0.11 0.44 0.10
BM SA 0.10 0.52 0.16 -0.06 0.11 1.00 0.37 0.01
BM Comp I 0.51 -0.08 0.77 0.37 0.44 0.37 1.00 0.39
BM Comp II 0.17 -0.13 0.51 0.77 0.10 0.01 0.39 1.00
5.4.2.2 Factor Mimicking Portfolio Return Correlations
Table 5.10 shows the correlations between the Fama-French factor mimicking portfolio
returns. Ideally, the explanatory factors should be independent of one another. This
means we would prefer the correlation coefficients to be close to zero. We observe that the
correlation between the Fama-French factors are in general low and evenly split between
being positive and negative. There are however, two correlation coefficients which stand
out: the correlation between SMB and RMW at -0.36 and the correlation between CMA
and HML at 0.27. These correlations indicate that for our sample, small firms are typically
unprofitable and that the average high book-to-market firm invests conservatively.
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Table 5.10: This table reports the correlations between the Fama-French factor mimicking portfolio
returns. All factors are created using value-weighted stock returns.
SMB HML CMA RMW RM - RF
SMB 1.00 0.08 0.07 -0.36 -0.14
HML 0.08 1.00 0.27 -0.10 -0.02
CMA 0.07 0.27 1.00 -0.08 -0.08
RMW -0.36 -0.10 -0.08 1.00 -0.18
RM - RF -0.14 -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 1.00
5.4.2.3 Factor Returns Correlation Overview
In Table 5.11 we report the correlations between the various estimates of the financial
constraint factor, the Fama-French factors and the market portfolio. We see that the
correlation between the financial constraint factor and the HML and CMA factors are
quite low. Additionally, the financial constraint factor does not seem to exhibit any clear
covariation with the general market. The correlation with the RMW is stronger and for
the most part negative. In sum, Table 5.11 indicates that the SMB33 and the RMW
factors should be the most important variables in explaining the return movements of
the financial constraint factor. Furthermore, these correlations indicate once again that
constrained firms are typically small and unprofitable.
Table 5.11: This table reports the correlations between the financial constraint factor as estimated
by each of the four classification schemes, the Fama-French factors, and the value-weighted market-
portfolio. BM-neutralized financial constraint factors are denoted with BM. All factors are created using
value-weighted stock returns.
SMB SA Comp I Comp II BM Size BM SA BM
Comp I
BM
Comp II
HML CMA RMW RM - RF
SMB 1.00 -0.26 0.54 0.30 0.88 0.10 0.51 0.17 0.08 0.07 -0.36 -0.14
SA -0.26 1.00 -0.21 -0.31 -0.07 0.52 -0.08 -0.13 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.12
Comp I 0.54 -0.21 1.00 0.60 0.39 0.16 0.77 0.51 -0.07 -0.05 -0.55 0.09
Comp II 0.30 -0.31 0.60 1.00 0.14 -0.06 0.37 0.77 -0.03 -0.07 -0.56 0.17
BM Size 0.88 -0.07 0.39 0.14 1.00 0.11 0.44 0.10 0.01 0.09 -0.20 -0.15
BM SA 0.10 0.52 0.16 -0.06 0.11 1.00 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.16
BM Comp I 0.51 -0.08 0.77 0.37 0.44 0.37 1.00 0.39 -0.03 0.00 -0.37 0.07
BM Comp II 0.17 -0.13 0.51 0.77 0.10 0.01 0.39 1.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.38 0.18
HML 0.08 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 1.00 0.27 -0.10 -0.02
CMA 0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.27 1.00 -0.08 -0.08
RMW -0.36 0.25 -0.55 -0.56 -0.20 -0.11 -0.37 -0.38 -0.10 -0.08 1.00 -0.18
RM - RF -0.14 0.12 0.09 0.17 -0.15 0.16 0.07 0.18 -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 1.00
33The SMB factor should be important in explaining the financial constraint factor as estimated by
the Composite I-, Composite II and SA-Indexes.
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5.4.3 Asset Pricing Regressions
We follow Lamont et al. (2001) and investigate whether standard asset pricing models
can explain the return variation of the financial constraint factor. Using monthly return
data, we regress the various estimates of the financial constraint factor on the CAPM, the
Fama-French three-factor model and the Fama-French five-factor model. The regression
equations are written as follows
i. CAPM
FCt = α + β(R
M
t −RFt ) + t (5.3)
ii. Fama-French Three Factor Model
FCt = α + β1MKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + t (5.4)
iii. Fama-French Five Factor Model
FCt = α + β1MKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4CMAt + β5RMWt + t (5.5)
where FCt is the financial constraint factor at time t as estimated by one of the classification
schemes and RFt is the risk-free rate34 at time t. MKT is the value-weighted market
portfolio, which we calculate as the value-weighted average excess return over the risk-
free rate for the full sample. SMB, HML, CMA and RMW are the Fama-French factor
mimicking portfolios, which we detail the construction of in section A9 of the appendix.
The regression results are reported in Table 5.12, where Panel A reports the results for
the one-way sorted financial constraint factor, while Panel B reports the results for the
book-to-market neutralized financial constraint factor. There are two things to look
for in these tables. First, if a model is correctly specified and thus captures all return
variation, its pricing error alpha equals zero (Merton et al. (1973)). If the intercept is
significantly different from zero, the average return on the financial constraint factor is
not well explained by the factors. Second, R2 measures how much of the variation in the
financial constraint factor can be explained by known systematic factors. If the R2 is low,
34For the risk-free rate, we use the monthly NIBOR rate, which is available from 1986 and published
by Norges Bank, to match the monthly stock market return data.
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then the financial constraint factor measures some independent source of return variance.
5.4.3.1 One-Way Sorted Regressions
The CAPM misprices the Composite I constraint factor with an alpha of 2% per month.
This means that buying a portfolio of firms classified as constrained and selling a portfolio
of unconstrained firms as classified by the Composite I index generates a positive return
which cannot be explained by general market variations. Both the SA-Index and Composite
II constraint factors have zero intercepts and significantly positive coefficients on the
market factor. The positive coefficients on the market factor reflects that the betas of
constrained firms are higher than those of unconstrained firms. We note that although
the CAPM does not misprice the SA-Index and Composite II constraint factors, hardly
any of the variance is explained.
Moving from the CAPM to the Fama-French three-factor model results in Composite I’s
alpha falling to zero and the explained variation increasing to 32%. This means that the
risk premium found in Table 5.5 for the Composite I Index reflects known empirical factors
rather than a new source of independent variation. Both the SA-Index and Composite II
constraint factors can also be priced using the Fama-French three factor model; however,
the explained variation is still low for both models. Finally, going from the three-factor
to the five-factor model mainly serves to increase the explained variation of the return
movements. We note that none of the asset pricing models have an R2 over 50%, which
means there are still large sources of unexplained variance in the financial constraint
factor.
To interperate the factor loadings35 note that the financial constraint factor is created
by subtracting the returns of constrained firms from unconstrained firms, which mimicks
the act of buying a portfolio of constrained firms and selling a portfolio of unconstrained
firms. The Fama-French factors are created in the same way. Thus, for example, the
Composite I-based financial constraint factor loads significantly positive on the SMB
factor and significantly negative on the RMW and HML factors. This means that the
financial constraint factor returns behave like the stocks of small unprofitable firms with
low book-to-market values.
35These are the coefficients on the Fama-French Factors and the market portfolio.
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5.4.3.2 Double-Sorted Regressions
The double-sorted results are reported in Panel B of Table 5.12. We see that the CAPM
is unable to price any of the double-sorted financial constraint factors. Moving to the
Fama-French three factor model results in the intercepts of both the SA-Index and
Composite II Index losing their significance. The intercept of the Composite I Index is still
significantly greater than zero, generating a positive alpha of 1% per month. Moving to the
five-factor model does not eliminate the positive alpha of the Composite I Index; in fact,
its significance increases from the three-factor model. Thus, among the value-weighted
financial constraint factors, only the book-to-market neutralized Composite I Index cannot
be priced by standard asset pricing models. We note that the explained variance of these
double-sorted portfolios is considerably lower than the one-way sorted portfolios.
5.4.3.3 Equal-Weighted Regressions
Similarly to the value-weighted regressions in Table 5.12, we report the regression results
for the financial constraint factors created using equal-weighted stock returns in Table 5.13.
For all financial constraint factors but the book-to-market neutralized SA-Index, the risk
premiums can be explained by known empirical factors. The returns of the book-to-market
neutralized SA-Index are not well explained by any of the models, as the intercept is
positive and significant in all cases, and the explained variance does not rise above 30%.
As reported in Table 5.13, the double-sorted SA-Index is the only equal-weighted portfolio
where we find a strongly significant financial constraint factor. This further indicates that
the SA-Index captures some non-linearities in the data.
5.4.3.4 Conclusions from the Asset Pricing Regressions
The results show some indication that the financial constraint premiums found in section 5.2
are indeed linked to financial constraints, as the returns of the book-to-market neutralized
Composite I in Table 5.12 and the book-to-market neutralized SA-Index in Table 5.13,
cannot be explained by the benchmark asset pricing models. We also test whether the size
based financial constraint factor can be explained by the other risk factors by regressing
the SMB factor on the CAPM and the Fama-French factor models without the SMB
factor. The results are reported in Table 5.14. We see that the intercept is positive and
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72 5.4 Asset Pricing and the Financial Constraint Factor
significant in all regressions. Furthermore, the explained variance is small. The results
clearly show that the size factor cannot be explained by the other risk factors. Thus, if
the SMB factor is a proxy for financial constraints, then the results clearly show that
financial constraints are a source of independently priced risk.
Table 5.14: This table reports the results from regressing the SMB factor on the CAPM and the
Fama-French three- and five-factor models, excluding the SMB factor. The p-values are reported in the
parenthesis and computed via Newey and West (1987) coefficients. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance
level is given by *, ** and *** respectively.
Size BM-neutralized Size
CAPM FF three-factor FF five-factor CAPM FF three-factor FF five-factor
Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value
Intercept 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.02) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
RM - RF -0.15** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.00) -0.22*** (0.00) -0.15** (0.02) -0.15** (0.02) -0.19*** (0.00)
HML 0.07 (0.24) 0.03 (0.63) 0.01 (0.90) -0.03 (0.59)
CMA 0.01 (0.86) 0.06 (0.28)
RMW -0.32*** (0.00) -0.18*** (0.00)
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.08
Adj. R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.07
5.4.4 Asset Pricing Conclusions
The main finding in this section is that the portfolios created by the Composite I Index,36
SA-Index,37 and size classification schemes capture common comovements in stock returns
not captured by factors. We note that the SA-Index likely does not capture financial
constraints, which leaves us with size and the Composite I Index as our key measures.
Thus, our results are partly dependent on the conviction that size is a good proxy for
financial constraints.
We find it likely that the size-effect reflects, at least in part, a financial constraint risk
premium for two reasons. First, as we show in section 4.3, size is able to capture variations
in the supply of external capital curve over time, which in turn indicates that size can
be used to identify financially constrained firms. Second, we find that the size-based
financial constraint factor covaries with business and credit cycles, and that there is a
clear connection to real firm performance. Zhang (2006)’s suggestion that the size effect
may reflect information uncertainty seems unlikely in light of our findings. If the size
36As measured by the value-weighted BM-neutralized financial constraint factor.
37As measured by the equal-weighted BM-neutralized financial constraint factor. We note that although
we find an independently verifiable risk premium using this measure, it is unlikely that the risk premium
is related to financial constraints, as discussed in section 5.4.3.
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effect reflects information uncertainty, then the information provided by constrained firms
must vary collectively with business and credit cycles, which does not seem reasonable.
On the other hand, Liu (2006)’s argument that the size effect reflects lower stock market
liquidity is reasonable as stock market liquidity does fluctuate with business and credit
cycles. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the entire risk premium we find is related to
financial constraints, but we find it highly probable that a part of it is.
In sum, it seems likely that we have found an independently identifiable return stream
generated by buying portfolios of constrained firms and selling portfolios of unconstrained
firms. This serves to confirm the real-financial connection we have documented throughout
the thesis and completes our analysis.
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to answer two questions at the intersection of
macroeconomics and finance. First, are financially constrained firms fundamentally
riskier than unconstrained firms? Second, is this risk priced in securities markets in the
form of an independently identifiable financial constraint factor? We have investigated
these questions in the context of the Norwegian economy and securities markets.
The first question looks at the real effects of financial constraints. Our results show that
financially constrained firms are fundamentally riskier than unconstrained firms in the
sense that their earnings- and investment growth rates exhibit stronger covariation with
systematic factors than those of unconstrained firms. This means that financial constraints
have real effects which lead to heterogeneous firm responses to macroeconomic shocks.
Furthermore, the results indicate that financial constraints are time-varying and that they
bind more in downturns than expansions. This means that financial constraints, through
their effect on real earnings- and investment growth, propagate and amplify shocks to the
Norwegian economy. These results are generally comparable with previous results found
for the US, suggesting that financial constraints have similar real effects across different
time-periods and economic environments.
Specific to Norway, we find a negative relationship between the oil price and financial
constraints, i.e. when the oil price is low, financial constraints bind more. We show
that one part of this result stems from the market structure of the oil sector which leads
to heterogeneous responses in the financial positions of firms following oil price shocks.
Our results indicate that the other part of this negative relationship is a consequence of
constrained firms being more sensitive to economic fluctuations than unconstrained firms.
The second question looks at the valuation effects of financial constraints. From the factor
mimicking portfolios we find that financial constraints are a source of independently priced
risk, as predicted by asset pricing theory. We note that this conclusion rests in part on
the use of value-weighted portfolios, and in part on the conviction that firm size captures,
at least in part, financial constraints. Specifically, we find that the returns of the financial
constraint factor, as measured by size, the BM-neutralized Composite I Index and the
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BM-neutralized SA-Index, cannot be explained by standard asset pricing models.
Taking the financial results together with the real results allows us to characterize a
macroeconomy-equity valuation channel along the lines of Gertler and Bernanke (1989).
For example, a negative macroeconomic shock will reduce the equity valuation of all firms
as future expected cash flows decline. However, for financially constrained firms, the
reduced net worth will increase agency costs, increasing the external finance premium and
thus, decreasing investments which will in turn lead to a drop in future expected cash
flows resulting in a decline in forward looking asset prices such as stocks. As a consequence
of this accelerator effect, we find that the stock returns of financially constrained firms
underperform those of unconstrained firms in downturns and periods of tight credit
conditions, i.e. when financial constraints bind the most, and outperform in expansions,
when constraints bind the least.
We find two interesting research directions to carry on the work on financial constraints
forward. First, an important next step is the use of textual analysis to more precisely
uncover the key underlying factors determining financial constraints in Norway, as is done
for the US by Bodnaruk et al. (2015) and Buehlmaier and Whited (2018). These factors
can then be related to firm characteristics such as size and age in order to formulate
possible policy measures to mitigate the effects of financial constraints. The textual
analysis results can also be used to create an index analogous to the SA-Index, KZ-Index
or WW-Index for Norwegian firms, which in turn can be used to gauge how frictions
in the Norwegian financial system varies over time. Second, it would be interesting to
investigate how lending in Norway differs from other countries, in particular the US, and
how this affects frictions in the financial system and the nature of financial constraints.
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Appendix
A1 Sample Size Evolution
Figure A1.1: Sample size evolution
Number of unique firms in the sample in the period July 1996 to December 2018.
A2 Historical Time Series of the Oil Price
Figure A2.1: An illustration of the the average monthly oil price from July 1996 to December
2018. The shaded areas are periods of recession in Norway, periods as identified by Aastveit et al.
(2016).
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The SUR system, first proposed by Zellner (1962), comprises of several individual
relationships that are linked by the fact that their disturbances or the error terms are
correlated. There are two main motivations for using an SUR-system. The first reason is
to gain efficiency in estimation by combining information contained in different equations.
Second, a SUR-system allows us to test restrictions that involve parameters in different
equations, see Roger Moon and Perron (2006). The disturbance terms of these equations
may be contemporaneously correlated because unconsidered factors that influence the
disturbance term in one equation may also influence the disturbance terms in other
equations. Ignoring this contemporaneous correlation and estimating these equations
separately leads to inefficient estimates of the coefficients. Estimating all equations
simultaneously with a generalized least squares estimator, which takes the covariance
structure of the residuals into account, leads to efficient estimates.
We give a brief overview of the general steps in estimating a seemingly unrelated regression
system. For a more detailed overview, see for example Zellner (1962). Suppose there are
m regression equations
yir = x
T
irβi + εir, i = 1, ...,m (A3.1)
Here i represents the equation number and r = 1, ..., R is the time period. The number of
observations R is assumed to be large, so that in this overview we let R →∞, while the
number of equations m remains fixed. Each equation i has a single response variable yir,
and a ki - dimensional vector of regressors xir. If we stack observations corresponding
to the i− th equation into R-dimensional vectors and matrices, then the model can be
written in vector form as:
yi = Xiβi + εi, i = 1, ...,m (A3.2)
where yi and εi are R × 1 vectors and Xi is a R × ki matrix and βi is a ki × 1 vector.
Finally, if we stack these m vector equations on top of each other, the system will take
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the form: 
y1
y2
...
ym
 =

X1 . . . 0
0
... . . .
...
0 . . . Xm


β1
β2
...
βm
+

ε1
ε2
...
εm
 = Xβ + ε (A3.3)
The assumption of the model is that the error terms εir are independent across time, but
may have cross-equation contemporaneous correlations. Thus we assume that
E[εirεis|X] = 0whenever r 6= sE[εirεis|X] = σij (A3.4)
Denoting Σ = [σij] the m × m skedaticity matrix of each observation, the covariance
matrix of the stack error terms ε will be equal to
Ω = E[εεT |X] = Σ⊗ IR (A3.5)
Where IR is the R-dimensional identity matrix and ⊗IR denotes that matrix Konecker
product.
The SUR model is usually estimated using the feasible generalized least squares method.
This is a two-step method where in the first step we run ordinary least squares regression
for Eq. A3.3. The residuals from this regression are used to estimate the elements of
matrix Σ,
σˆij =
1
R
εˆi
T εˆi (A3.6)
In the second step we run a generalized least squares regression for A3.3 using the variance
of the matrix Ωˆ = Σˆ⊗ IR,
βˆ = (XT (Σˆ−1 ⊗ IR))−1XT (Σˆ−1 ⊗ IR)y (A3.7)
The estimator is unbiased in small samples assuming the error terms εir have symmetric
distribution. In large samples it is consistent and asymptotically normal.
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When estimating the model, we impose cross-equational linear restrictions, testing for
equality between the coefficients in the constrained and unconstrained equation. We then
use a Wald-test in-order to obtain the correct p-values for the difference coefficients.
A4 Responses of Business Fundamentals to Macroeconomic Shocks using the
Credit-Gap and NIBOR Spread 85
A4 Responses of Business Fundamentals to
Macroeconomic Shocks using the Credit-Gap and
NIBOR Spread
Table A4.1: This table provides the results from regressing the median real operating earnings- and
investment growth of portfolios of constrained and unconstrained firms on various macroeconomic and
credit market variables. The results are provided in Panel A and B respectively. Specifically, the regression
equation is given by γt = α+ ϕMACROt + ηCONTROLt + ut. The macroeconomic and credit market
variables include the growth rates of industrial production (Ind Prod), the unemployment rate (Unempl),
the oil price, the credit-gap, and the three-month NIBOR spread. The control variables include the change
in the Norwegian policy rate, the trade-weighted NOK currency index and the ten-over-two year US yield
spread. See section 3.1 and 3.2 for a further elaboration on the macroeconomic variables, and section
4.1.1 and 4.2 for the construction of the various classification schemes. The right-hand side variables are
normalized so they have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. The independent variables are
signed such that a positive value represents a worsening of macroeconomic conditions or tightening of
credit markets. Difference coefficients across regressions are estimated via a SUR-system. The p-values of
the original coefficients are reported in the parenthesis and are computed via Newey and West (1987)
coefficients. The 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level is given by *, ** and *** respectively.
Panel A: Earnings Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraint Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit Gap NIBOR Spread
Size
Constrained (C) -0.13 -0.04** -0.06* -0.07 0.09
(0.63) (0.05) (0.06) (0.26) (0.14)
Unconstrained (U) -0.03** -0.10*** 0.04*** 0.00 -0.06***
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.51) (0.00)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.15***
(0.97) (0.52) (0.15) (0.20) (0.00)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.03 -0.10*** -0.02 -0.04 0.07
(0.35) (0.00) (0.68) (0.34) (0.18)
Unconstrained (U) 0.01 -0.06*** 0.00 -0.02 0.00
(0.69) (0.00) (0.92) (0.24) (0.77)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.07**
(0.30) (0.28) (0.75) (0.78) (0.03)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13 0.14*
(0.29) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.08)
Unconstrained (U) -0.02 -0.05** 0.03 -0.02 -0.04**
(0.86) (0.05) (0.25) (0.15) (0.05)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.09 -0.04 -0.18 -0.11* 0.18***
(0.31) (0.69) (0.15) (0.08) (0.01)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.01 0.15**
(0.28) (0.19) (0.51) (0.41) (0.04)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.05* -0.04 0.00 -0.02
(0.95) (0.08) (0.18) (0.71) (0.45)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.12 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.17**
(0.25) (0.53) (0.55) (0.26) (0.02)
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Panel B: Investment Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraint Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit Gap NIBOR Spread
Size
Constrained (C) -0.01 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.86) (0.00) (0.27) (0.50) (0.95)
Unconstrained (U) -0.01* -0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.00) (0.76) (0.18) (0.64)
Difference (C) - (U) 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.97) (0.16) (0.44) (0.48) (0.85)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00
(0.73) (0.42) (0.62) (0.25) (0.85)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.02** -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.28) (0.04) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.01 0.00 0.03* -0.02 0.00
(0.24) (0.86) (0.09) (0.11) (0.46)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.01** 0.00*** -0.01** -0.03*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.57)
Unconstrained (U) -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.43) (0.17) (0.89) (0.13) (0.59)
Difference (C) - (U) 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00
(0.81) (0.39) (0.53) (0.25) (0.15)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.88) (0.07) (0.75) (0.96) (0.14)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.04*** 0.00 0.01** -0.01
(0.56) (0.00) (0.36) (0.04) (0.43)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.01 0.01*** -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.74) (0.00) (0.61) (0.63) (0.25)
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Table A5.1: The table reports the results from re-running the fundamental regression reported in
Table 5.2 excluding all oil companies. These are companies classified as belonging to the oil sector through
SIC codes, as we show in section 3.4, and include both oil production and exploration companies, and oil
service companies. The results are provided in Panel A and B respectively. Specifically, the regression
equation is given by γt = α+ ϕMACROt + ηCONTROLt + ut. The macroeconomic and credit market
variables include the growth rates of industrial production (Ind Prod), the unemployment rate (Unempl),
the oil price, the credit-to-GDP (Credit/GDP), and the two-year swap-spread (Swap Spread). The
control variables include the change in the Norwegian policy rate, the trade-weighted NOK currency
index and the ten-over-two year US yield spread. See section 3.1 and 3.2 for a further elaboration on
the macroeconomic variables, and section 4.1.1 and 4.2 for the construction of the various classification
schemes. The right-hand side variables are normalized so they have zero mean and standard deviation
equal to one. The independent variables are signed such that a positive value represents a worsening of
macroeconomic conditions or tightening of credit markets. Difference coefficients across regressions are
estimated via a SUR-system. The p-values of the original coefficients are reported in the parenthesis and
are computed via Newey and West (1987) coefficients. The 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level is given by
*, ** and *** respectively.
Panel A: Earnings Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraint Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit/GDP Swap Spread
Size
Constrained (C) -0.08* -0.22*** -0.07*** -0.15*** 0.11**
(0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Unconstrained (U) -0.04 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.22) (0.00) (0.90) (0.01) (0.00)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.02 -0.14** -0.19** -0.09 0.16***
(0.47) (0.02) (0.04) (0.17) (0.00)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.06* -0.18*** -0.01 -0.17** 0.08
(0.18) (0.01) (0.13) (0.05) (0.11)
Unconstrained (U) 0.03 -0.08*** 0.03 -0.04** 0.00
(0.18) (0.00) (0.67) (0.02) (0.88)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13** 0.08*
(0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.15*** -0.25* -0.08*** -0.23 0.18**
(0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.20) (0.03)
Unconstrained (U) 0.01 -0.05*** 0.05*** -0.03 -0.02
(0.32) (0.01) (0.00) (0.24) (0.55)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.16** -0.20** -0.13 -0.20*** 0.20***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.48) (0.01) (0.00)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.08 -0.19*** -0.06 -0.17*** 0.13**
(0.42) (0.01) (0.23) (0.00) (0.02)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.06* 0.00 -0.04 -0.01
(0.91) (0.08) (0.68) (0.15) (0.74)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.08* -0.13 -0.06 -0.13* 0.14***
(0.08) (0.27) (0.98) (0.09) (0.01)
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Panel B: Investment Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraint Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit/GDP Swap Spread
Size
Constrained (C) -0.01 -0.09*** -0.01*** -0.06* 0.00
(0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.99)
Unconstrained (U) -0.02* -0.04*** 0.00 -0.03 0.00
(0.10) (0.00) (0.84) (0.37) (0.96)
Difference (C)-(U) 0.01 -0.05*** -0.01* -0.03* 0.00
(0.43) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09) (0.98)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.04*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.35)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.00
(0.57) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.76)
Difference (C)-(U) -0.04*** -0.02 -0.01* -0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.32) (0.07) (0.48) (0.34)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.04 -0.03* -0.01 -0.11*** 0.00
(0.19) (0.06) (0.16) (0.00) (0.98)
Unconstrained (U) -0.01 -0.04*** 0.02* -0.02* 0.00
(0.33) (0.00) (0.10) (0.08) (0.54)
Difference (C)-(U) -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.09*** 0.00
(0.23) (0.60) (0.26) (0.00) (0.83)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.02
(0.93) (0.96) (0.79) (0.88) (0.94)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.05*** 0.03 -0.03 0.00
(0.59) (0.00) (0.51) (0.42) (0.21)
Difference (C)-(U) -0.01* 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.02
(0.09) (0.18) (0.18) (0.31) (0.17)
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Table A6.1: This table reports the results from re-running the regression in Table 5.2 excluding
2008 and 2009. The results are provided in Panel A and B respectively. Specifically, the regression
equation is given by γt = α+ ϕMACROt + ηCONTROLt + ut. The macroeconomic and credit market
variables include the growth rates of industrial production (Ind Prod), the unemployment rate (Unempl),
the oil price, the credit-to-GDP (Credit/GDP), and the two-year swap-spread (Swap Spread). The
control variables include the change in the Norwegian policy rate, the trade-weighted NOK currency
index and the ten-over-two year US yield spread. See section 3.1 and 3.2 for a further elaboration on
the macroeconomic variables, and section 4.1.1 and 4.2 for the construction of the various classification
schemes. The right-hand side variables are normalized so they have zero mean and standard deviation
equal to one. The independent variables are signed such that a positive value represents a worsening of
macroeconomic conditions or tightening of credit markets. Difference coefficients across regressions are
estimated via a SUR-system. The p-values of the original coefficients are reported in the parenthesis and
are computed via Newey and West (1987) coefficients. The 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level is given by
*, ** and *** respectively.
Panel A: Earnings Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraint Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit/GDP Swap Spread
Size
Constrained (C) -0.10** -0.13** -0.18*** -0.14** -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11)
Unconstrained (U) -0.04 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.05** -0.06***
(0.32) (0.00) (0.79) (0.04) (0.00)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.06 -0.06 -0.19*** -0.09 0.05***
(0.27) (0.24) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.10* -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.07** -0.02
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.57)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04**
(0.99) (0.00) (0.67) (0.32) (0.03)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.10* -0.07* -0.10** -0.06 0.02*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.27) (0.06)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.22*** -0.08 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.23)
Unconstrained (U) -0.01 -0.02 -0.03** -0.02 -0.05**
(0.48) (0.60) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.19** -0.06 0.05**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.62) (0.04)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.25*** -0.23** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.01
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05**
(0.51) (0.70) (0.68) (0.61) (0.02)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.25*** -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.14* 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01)
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Panel B: Investment Growth
Macroeconomic Variables
Financial Constraint Criteria Ind Prod Unempl Oil Price Credit/GDP Swap Spread
Size
Constrained (C) -0.01 -0.06* -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03**
(0.62) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Unconstrained (U) -0.02** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.45) (0.24) (0.04)
Difference (C) - (U) 0.01 -0.03 -0.04* -0.03 -0.02
(0.65) (0.28) (0.08) (0.26) (0.25)
SA-Index
Constrained (C) -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03*** -0.04** -0.01**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.02** -0.02 -0.02 0.00
(0.36) (0.02) (0.11) (0.23) (0.99)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.04*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.00) (0.95) (0.33) (0.14) (0.32)
Composite I
Constrained (C) -0.08*** -0.04** -0.08** -0.06** 0.00
(0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.76)
Unconstrained (U) 0.00 -0.04** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.01
(0.90) (0.02) (0.13) (0.00) (0.24)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.08*** 0.00 -0.06* -0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.98) (0.07) (0.49) (0.81)
Composite II
Constrained (C) -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.01***
(0.26) (0.75) (0.70) (0.34) (0.00)
Unconstrained (U) 0.02* -0.04** -0.02** -0.05*** -0.01
(0.09) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.31)
Difference (C) - (U) -0.05** 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02**
(0.02) (0.17) (0.83) (0.74) (0.05)
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Table A7.1: This table is a replication of Table 3.1 illustrating the sample development
including the KZ-Index as a measure of financial constraints. The sample size is drastically
reduced. The data set we use in the results has 252 unique firms, while this data set has 131.
The inclusion of dividends is the most important driver of the data reductions, nearly halving
the sample size. Including variables constructed with items from cash flow statements would
reduce the sample size even further.
Panel A: Security data Observations Companies Months
Number Diff Number Number
Compustat file 50951 415 287
Day > 25 48506 -2445 413 287
Return calculation 40231 -8275 406 286
Omit penny stocks 38064 -2167 403 286
Omit financial companies 30184 -7880 311 286
Merge with macrodata 29853 -331 311 279
Panel B: Accounting data Observations Companies Years
Number Diff Number Number
Compustat file 4005 377 24
Omit financial companies 3993 -12 375 24
Omit at < 0 3971 -22 375 24
Omit BE < 0 3967 -4 375 24
Omit lt < 0 3850 -117 375 24
Omit div payout < 0 1220 -2630 190 24
Omit empty classification variables 1068 -152 183 23
Panel C: Merged file Observations Companies Years
Number Diff Number Number
Merge files 1637 152 22
Allign ME at june with t - 1 735 -902 132 22
Match with return data 8142 131 257*
*Monthly
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Table A8.1: Companies with directly reclassified SIC codes. The Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) are four-digit codes that indicate the company’s type of business.
Company SIC Original Group New Group
TELENOR ASA 4812 Transportation Other
HAFSLUND ASA 4911 Transportation Other
P4 RADIO HELE NORGE ASA 4832 Transportation Other
NEXTGENTEL HOLDING ASA 4899 Transportation Other
ARENDALS FOSSEKOMPANI ASA 4899 Transportation Other
REACH SUBSEA ASA 4931 Transportation Oil & Gas
DOF ASA 4400 Transportation Oil & Gas
AKER FLOATING PRODUCTION ASA 4400 Transportation Oil & Gas
EIDESVIK OFFSHORE ASA 4400 Transportation Oil & Gas
HAVILA SHIPPING ASA 4400 Transportation Oil & Gas
FARSTAD SHIPPING ASA 4400 Transportation Oil & Gas
GC RIEBER SHIPPING ASA 1382 Mining Transportation
HUNTER GROUP ASA 1382 Mining Transportation
AMERICAN SHIPPING COMPANY ASA 3730 Manufacturing Transportation
SCHIBSTED ASA 2711 Manufacturing Other
POLARIS MEDIA ASA 2711 Manufacturing Other
AKER MARITIME ASA 3533 Manufacturing Oil & Gas
EQUINOR ASA 2911 Manufacturing Oil & Gas
AKER RGI ASA 3533 Manufacturing Oil & Gas
ADVANCED PROD & LOADING ASA 3533 Manufacturing Oil & Gas
BJORGE GRUPPEN ASA 3533 Manufacturing Oil & Gas
GRENLAND GROUP ASA 3533 Manufacturing Oil & Gas
Table A8.2: This table gives an overview of the number of observations classified as constrained
or unconstrained per industry group for each classification scheme. See section 3.4 for computation
and explanation of the classification schemes.
Accounting Data Security Data
Total Oil Transp Manuf Other Total Oil Transp Manuf Other
Size
Constrained C 554 97 57 223 177 5872 1058 618 2337 1859
Unconstrained U 560 166 50 202 142 5932 1739 505 2169 1519
SA-Index
Constrained C 548 140 30 204 174 5852 1540 325 2163 1824
Unconstrained U 560 113 91 185 171 5959 1156 983 1932 1888
Composite I
Constrained C 466 98 37 195 136 5135 1014 425 2048 1648
Unconstrained U 505 131 31 185 158 5347 1340 339 1970 1698
Composite II
Constrained C 462 103 57 182 120 5135 1173 339 1999 1624
Unconstrained U 400 86 23 165 126 3812 791 224 1545 1252
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Table A8.3: This table provides descriptive statistics for each of the four industry groups.
Market capitalization and total assets are denoted in MNOK.
Oil Companies Transport Companies
Mean Stdv Median Min Max Mean Stdv Median Min Max
Earnings growth -0.11 6.56 0.04 -43.78 64.26 0.25 3.72 0.00 -18.67 34.96
Investment growth 0.58 4.58 0.08 -1.00 92.16 0.09 0.54 0.01 -0.88 4.73
Market capitalization 39,300 191,221 1,833 14 1,875,589 2,889 4,074 1,236 52 22,813
Total assets 25,662 107,750 2,887 26 1,007,816 3,810 5,749 2,071 51 41,257
Debt-to-Assets 0.59 0.17 0.61 0.02 1.04 0.58 0.22 0.65 0.03 0.95
Book-to-Market 1.06 1.51 0.66 0.00 15.99 0.83 1.20 0.45 0.04 13.70
N 460 200
Manufacturing Companies Other Companies
Mean Stdv Median Min Max Mean Stdv Median Min Max
Earnings growth -0.40 6.16 -0.03 -92.98 35.99 0.18 3.73 0.04 -24.26 53.94
Investment growth 0.23 1.91 0.04 -0.90 45.49 0.21 0.77 0.04 -0.83 8.01
Market capitalization 12,087 39,257 1,169 15 337,992 15,898 68,266 1,003 47 773,851
Total assets 11,125 33,473 1,416 13 277,901 11,126 31,743 1,079 6 212,736
Debt-to-Assets 0.51 0.19 0.53 0.08 1.02 0.54 0.19 0.57 0.02 0.95
Book-to-Market 0.97 1.45 0.66 0.01 27.76 0.71 0.81 0.52 0.01 11.68
N 683 503
A9 Construction of the Fama-French Factor Mimicking
Portfolios
The Fama-French factor mimicking portfolios are created by dividing the sample into
three parts using 30% and 70% cutoffs at the end of June each year. We create all factors
using both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns. Furthermore, all factors
are one-way sorted, rather than double-sorted. For further details regarding the factors,
see Fama and French (2015, 1993, 1992). For each month we calculate the difference in
return between the portfolios, creating the factors as follows
1. Small-minus-big (SMB)
At the end of June each year we calculate the market capitalization of all firms, which we
use to divide the sample. Firms in the bottom percentile are labelled small (S), while firms
in the top percentile are labelled big (B). Subtracting the returns of the portfolio of small
firms from the portfolio of big firms creates the SMB factor. The SMB factor captures the
size-effect, which is the empirical observation that the returns of small firms outperforms
those of large firms, after controlling for market risk. The SMB factor mimicking portfolios
are the same as the financial constraint portfolios when using size as the classification
scheme.
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2. High-minus-low (HML)
Firms are sorted by their book-to-market values, as defined in section 4.1.2. The bottom
percentile is labelled low (L), while the top percentile is labelled high (H). We subtract
the monthly returns of the portfolio of high book-to-market firms from the portfolio of low
book-to-market firms, creating the HML factor. The HML factor captures the value-effect,
which is the empirical observation that the returns of high book-to-market firms, i.e.
value-firms, outperform the returns of low book-to-market firms, i.e. growth firms, after
controlling for market risk.
3. Conservative-minus-aggressive (CMA)
Firms are sorted by their growth in total assets, defined as investment in section 4.1.2.
The bottom percentile is labelled conservative (C) and the top percentile is labelled
aggressive (A). Subtracting the monthly returns of the portfolio of conservative firms from
the portfolio of aggressive firms creates the CMA factor. The CMA factor, also known
as the investment factor, captures the empirical observation that the returns of firms
which invest conservatively outperform the returns of firms which invest aggressively, after
controlling for market risk.
4. Robust-minus-weak (RMW)
Firms are sorted by their operating profitability, as defined in section 4.1.2. The bottom
percentile is labelled weak (W), while the top percentile is labelled robust (R). Subtracting
the returns of the robust portfolio from the weak portfolio creates the RMW factor. The
RMW factor, also known as the profitability factor, captures the empirical observation
that the returns of profitable firms are higher than those of less profitable firms, after
controlling for market risk.
